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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Here's a knocking indeed! If a man were porter of hell-gate, he should have 
old turning the key.1 
 
The porter in Macbeth would have feared less for his age if he were at the 
gates of the EU courts. Virtually all private litigants who come knocking at 
its doors to challenge EU norms directly are turned away for lack of standing.  
 
Under Article 230(4) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
('EC Treaty'), the porter would have only had to turn the key for those parties 
that were addressed in the measure they were contesting, and those directly 
concerned and individually concerned by it. Few parties satisfied either head of 
standing, and the restrictiveness of these rules was almost universally 
criticised in the literature.2 
                                                 
1 William Shakespeare, Macbeth (1605), Act 2 Scene 3. 
2 See, for example, Grainne De Burca, 'Fundamental Rights and Citizenship', in Bruno 
De Witte (ed), Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (EUI, 2003); 
Anthony Arnull, 'Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under Art 173 of 
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Enter Article 263(4) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
('TFEU' or 'Lisbon Treaty'), which retained the two pre-Lisbon heads of 
standing, but added a third. Under this new head, the porter must now open 
the doors to substantive challenge for litigants who are directly concerned by a 
regulatory act that does not entail implementing measures. The porter, however, is 
not perceptibly busier. Only four cases have been admissible under the third 
head as of yet.3 Most cases remain locked out as inadmissible direct 
challenges. 
 
This article seeks to do two things. First, it explains why it is still so difficult 
to have standing. Second, it criticizes this restrictive position. In that vein, 
the purpose of this article is diagnostic as well as critical. It is worth setting out 
the structure of the article at the same time that the substance of the article 
is explained. 
 
                                                 
the EEC Treaty' (1995) CMLR 32; Paul Craig, 'Standing, Rights and the Structure of 
Legal Argument' (2003) European Public Law 493; Ewa Biernat, 'The Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC and the Principle of Judicial Protection 
in the European Community' Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/03; Cornelia Koch, 
'Locus standi of private applicants under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the 
protection of individual's right to an effective remedy' (2005) European Law Review 
511. 
3 Case T-262/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:623, Microban and another v Commission; Case T-
296/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:375, Health Food Manufacturers Association and Others v 
Commission; Case T‑367/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:97, Bloufin Touna Ellas Naftiki 
Etaireia and Others v Commission; Case T-93/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:106, Bilbaína de 
Alquitranes and Others v ECHA.  
I note Bilbaína deals with the challenge to a tar derivative as a substance of 'very high 
concern'. Other cases either deal with other tar derivatives (Case T-96/10, 
ECLI:EU:2013:109, Rütgers and Others; Case T-94/10, ECLI:EU:2013:107, Rütgers and 
Others; Case T-95/10, ECLI:EU:2013:108, Cindu and Others) or other chemicals (T-
268/10, ECLI:EU:T:2015:698, PPG and SNF; T-135/13, ECLI:EU:2015:253, Hitachi and 
Others; T-134/13, ECLI:EU:2015:254, Polynt and Sintre.). Their factual and legal 
situation, however, was identical to that in Bilbaína, to which the cases make 
extensive reference. Given these similarities, reference is made to Bilbaína only and 
I consider only four cases to have succeeded on the third head. See discussion in Part 
III) 1) b), fn 38-45. This is, to the best of my research, accurate as of 24th July 2016.  
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It starts, in part II, with a very brief section that sketches out the pre-Lisbon 
position standing jurisprudence, and then offers a more detailed section that 
introduces the third head in Art 263(4) TFEU. 
 
Part III and part IV are diagnostic. They attempt to find and explain the 
reasons why, even after the addition of the third head, standing remains such 
a considerable hurdle to bringing direct challenges. Two reasons are explored 
here, one textual the other doctrinal. For clarity, the textual explanations are 
examined in part III, and the latter explanations are found in Part IV. 
Textually, standing remains restrictive because the EU courts have foisted 
narrow meanings on the criteria in the third head. Simply put, few direct 
challenges are admissible because the third head is a high hurdle to clear. 
However, the interpretation of the third head is highly unsatisfactory – and, 
in some cases, the third head is even more difficult to satisfy than the pre-
Lisbon heads. Moreover, as is pointed out, the courts could easily have seized 
upon the Lisbon reforms to chart a new and more liberal course for the 
standing jurisprudence. Why the courts refused to do so is explored in part 
IV, which traces and explains the doctrinal justifications in favour of the 
courts' restrictive interpretation despite the existence of other more liberal 
ones. It shows how they have consistently repudiated arguments in favour of 
relaxing the standing rules and unfailingly explained away the negative 
consequences flowing from this position. The courts, it shall be seen, thus 
start from a fundamentally restrictive view of the standing rules, a position 
which naturally fetters the prospects of greater admissibility for direct 
challenges. 
 
In short, the textual explanation gives us immediate reasons why so many 
direct actions fail – namely, the narrow meanings conferred on the standing 
criteria – and the doctrinal explanation brings the broader reasons why this is 
so into focus – namely, the courts' fundamentally restrictive interpretation of 
the standing rules. There are, of course, other reasons for this restrictive 
approach, but considerations of space preclude engaging to any satisfactory 
level of detail with the interesting social, political and historical factors that 
might be behind it. 
 
The article takes a critical turn in part V where it points out the flaws of this 
restrictive approach. It recognises that the standing rules can serve legitimate 
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ends as a filter on the disputes that are considered by the EU courts, but 
stresses that these ends are only attained if the standing rules are calibrated 
to maintain the right balance between admitting some direct actions and 
rejecting others for lack of standing. It argues that the present approach is far 
removed from this balanced scheme, and that the courts' justifications that 
prop up this problematic position are flawed. In so doing, it dispels the 
fundamentally restrictive starting point of the courts, and demonstrates that 
the arguments offered, time and time again, by the courts in favour of this 
approach should be rejected. They are mutually inconsistent, internally 
contradictory and undesirable as a matter of principle. A range of arguments 
in favour of broader standing rules is then briefly offered. 
 
The final part concludes with a reflective summary of the argument explored 
in the preceding parts. 
 
II. THE THREE HEADS OF STANDING 
 
1. Pre-Lisbon: The First and Second Heads  
Only a brief discussion is offered here in the interests of space and of avoiding 
repetition of existing literature. The interested reader is directed to the 
wealth of academic comment that deals with the pre-Lisbon situation, 
especially in relation to the interpretation of 'individual concern'.4 
 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, natural or legal persons could only have standing 
to challenge a measure directly on two heads. The first head was satisfied if 
the applicant was addressed in the contested provision, and the second 
required the applicant to be directly and individually concerned by the same. 
To that effect, Article 230(4) EC provided: 
 
Any natural or legal person may (…) institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of 
a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to the former. 
 
                                                 
4 See fn 2.  
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A. First Head: Addressed by the Contested Measure 
The first head would be satisfied, for example, where a party was found guilty 
of anti-competitive practices.5 In such a situation, the Commission Decision 
would specifically list the offending parties, and, possibly, fine them. This 
head was, however, of limited relevance. Third party competitors, who might 
otherwise have had an interest in the (non)-imposition of the fine, would not 
be able to rely on it. Nor would it be of use to a party affected by a 
Commission Decision addressed to Member States. This was often the case 
in State aid Decisions. Beneficiaries of the aid and other parties seeking to 
challenge the Decision would have to satisfy the second head of standing 
instead.6 It is thus only in a small number of cases that a party will actually be 
addressed by a contested act.  
 
B. Second Head: Directly and Individually Concerned by the Contested 
Measure 
The second head contains two criteria.  
Direct concern requires two cumulative sub-criteria to be met.7 First, the 
measure must directly affect the legal situation of the person concerned. This 
means that the measure in question must have some legal effect on the person 
seeking to contest it. Overall, this is not particularly difficult to satisfy. 
Second, the implementation of that measure must be purely automatic, 
resulting from Union norms without the application of other intermediate 
rules.8 Anti-dumping duties are a good example. These duties are imposed on 
the imports designated in the Commission or Council Regulation and at the 
rate specified therein. There is no scope for discretion on behalf of domestic 
                                                 
5 Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, and Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law, (OUP, 
2014), 7.86. 
6 ibid, 7.86 and 7.118; See also K. Jurimäë, 'Standing in State Aid Cases: What's the 
State of Play?' (2010) European State Aid Law Quarterly 303. 
7 Case C-142/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:163, Solar World v Commission, [22]; Northern 
Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development v Commission, C-248/12 
P, EU:C:2014:137, [21]. 
8 Joined Cases C-445/07 and C-455/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:529, Commission v Ente per le 
Ville Vesuviane, [45]; Case C-404/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:1998:196, GlencoreGrain v 
Commission, [41]; Case C-486/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2004:394, National Front v 
Parliament, [34]. 
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authorities or the need for domestic rules to enforce the duty.9 Their 
application – automatic and in pursuance of EU norms alone – is thus of 
direct concern to those importers seeking to challenge those duties.10  
 
Individual concern means, since the seminal Plaumann case, that a party must 
be affected by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other 
persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as 
in the case of the person addressed.11  
 
Although decided in 1963, this case is still cited, verbatim, today.12 The 
essence of the test is that a party needs to show that it has features or 
characteristics such that the contested measure affects them as if they were 
addressed by it. Thus, Plaumann were not able to directly challenge the hike 
in customs duties on clementines imported from third countries, as they 
could not show that they were affected in a way that distinguished them from 
all other undertakings that also imported such fruits. The term took on 
different meanings in different contexts, with individual concern being 
generally easier to satisfy in relation to State aid, for example.13 However, 
overall, the formulation was a high hurdle. Although some examples can be 
                                                 
9 T-155/94, ECLI:EU:T:1996:118, Climax Paper Converters v Council, [53]; C-118/77, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:92, ISO v Council, [26]; Case 121/77 ECLI:EU:C:1979:95 Fujikoshi 
and Others v Council, [11]; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-239/99, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:639, Nachi v Council, [73].  
10 See, in particular, ISO, ibid, [26]. 
11 Case C-25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, Plaumann v Commission. 
12 Case C-456/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, T & L Sugars Ltd and Others v Commission, 
[63]; C-583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament 
and Council, [72]; C-274/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, EU:C:2013:852, [46]. 
13 See fn 2; Lenaerts and Others, fn 5; Michael Rhimes, 'Nothing ado about much? 
Challenges to Anti-Dumping Measures After the Lisbon Reforms to Art 263(4) 
TFEU' (2016) European Journal of Risk Regulation 374.  
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found where this criterion was satisfied,14 it was notoriously difficult to show 
individual concern.15  
 
Together, these highly restrictive criteria made it very difficult for an 
individual to directly challenge provisions of EU law – a point almost 
universally criticised in the academic literature.16  
 
2. Post-Lisbon: The Third Head 
A third head of standing was included in Art 263(4) of the Lisbon Treaty, with 
the overall aim of relaxing the restrictive standing provisions and facilitating 
direct challenges to EU law.17 The relevant provision now reads as follows: 
 
Any natural or legal person may, (…) institute proceedings against an act 
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, 
and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not 
entail implementing measures. 
 
                                                 
14 Case C-309/89, ECLI:EU:C:1994:197 Codorníu v Commission, see fn 141; See Ewa 
Biernat, 'The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC and the 
Principle of Judicial Protection in the European Community' Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 12/03, p. 15 (Describing these rare exceptions as 'few and casuistic') 
15 See Paul Craig, 'Standing, Rights and the Structure of Legal Argument' (2003) 
European Public Law 493 (describing the test of individual concern as rendering it 
'literally impossible' for an applicant to succeed, at 494); See also Albertina Albors-
Lorens, 'Sealing the fate of private parties in annulment proceedings? The General 
Court and the New Standing test in Article 263(4)', (2012) CLJ 52, 53, individual 
concern as a 'formidable standing barrier that very few private applicants could 
surmount'; See also fn 141 – 143. 
16 See fn 2. For post-Lisbon critiques, see Steve Peers and Marios Costa, 'Judicial 
Review of EU Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2012) European Constitutional Law 
Review 82; Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem and Nils Baeten, 'Before the law stands 
a gatekeeper – or what is a 'regulatory act' in Article 263(4)' (2014) CMLR 1187, 
especially at fn 6; Albertina Albors-Lorens, 'Remedies against the EU institutions 
after Lisbon: an era of opportunity?' (2012) CLJ 507, 513. 
17 Inuit fn 12, at [57]; See Cornelia Koch, 'Locus Standi of private applicants under the 
EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the protection of individuals' right to an 
effective remedy' (2005) ELR 511. See fuller discussion below.  
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A party may now bring a direct challenge where they are directly concerned 
by a regulatory act without implementing measures. Naturally, the extent to 
which it expands the scope for bringing direct challenges hinges on how those 
three criteria are defined. It is worth briefly fleshing out these definitions, by 
reference to Microban18, to give an overall understanding of the third head and 
the gap in the standing rules that gave rise to the reforms. 
 
A. General Definitions, Microban and the Dilemma 
The notion of direct concern remains the same after the Lisbon amendments.19 
The definition of a regulatory act was first addressed by the General Court in 
Inuit20 The General Court held that a regulatory act should be understood as 
encompassing 'all acts of general application' that are not 'legislative acts'.21 
This imports two sub-criteria. First, the act in question must be one that 
applies to 'objectively determined situations and produces legal effects in 
regard to categories of persons envisaged generally and in the abstract'. 
Second, it must not be adopted in accordance with either the ordinary 
legislative procedure or the special legislative procedure within the meaning 
of paragraphs 1 to 3 of Art. 289 TFEU. This two-part definition was approved 
on appeal.22  
 
The requirement that the challenged provision may not entail implementing 
measures, in short, requires that the contested measure have legal effects vis-
à-vis the complainant as a matter of automaticity, without the need for action 
at national level. In other words, the contested provision must in and of itself 
give rise to the legal effects that the applicant seeks to challenge. 
 
A good, brief, example of a case that satisfies all these criteria is Microban.23 
The applicants sought to challenge a Commission Decision that refused to 
                                                 
18 Case T-262/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:623, Microban and another v Commission. 
19 See case law and discussion in the first section of part III. 2. 
20 Case T-18/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:419 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European 
Parliament and Council,  
21 ibid, [45], [56]  
22 Inuit, fn 12, [51] – [61] 
23 Microban fn 18. 
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include triclosan in the harmonised list of permissible chemicals that could 
come into contact with foodstuffs.  
 
The criterion of direct concern was satisfied. First, their legal situation was 
affected in that Microban used the chemical in products designed to come 
into contact with foodstuffs, and, second, no discretion was left to the 
Member States as to banning triclosan. The Decision was a regulatory act, the 
legal basis being Art 11(3) of Regulation No 1935/2004, on materials and 
articles intended to come into contact with food. It was not a legislative 
measure, and, given that the court found that it was of general application, it 
was therefore a regulatory measure within the third head.24  
 
The final criterion of not entailing implementing measures was also satisfied. This 
was because the non-inclusion of the substance in the relevant list had the 
immediate consequence that it was no longer permissible to put the 
substance into materials that would come into contact with foodstuffs. The 
non-inclusion was thus automatic, with immediate effect, and no action was 
required on behalf of the Member States. The applicants' action was 
admissible, and the General Court struck down the ban as having been 
adopted ultra vires. 
 
It is useful to introduce what shall be referred to as the 'dilemma' at this 
juncture. Under Art 230(4) EC, it is very unlikely that Microban would have 
been able to show individual concern, that is, that they, in particular, out of 
all the other undertakings who used triclosan in products intended to come 
into contact with food, were affected by the ban as if it addressed them. Their 
challenge would have mostly likely been inadmissible.25 However, as it has 
been seen, the legal effects of the ban arose automatically from the non-
inclusion of triclosan in the relevant list. There would have been no norms at 
the national level that could be challenged, and no possibility of challenging 
the measure directly at EU level for lack of standing. Microban would have 
been put in an invidious position; they would have either had to comply with 
                                                 
24 ibid, at [22]. 
25 Compare with, for example, the pre-Lisbon cases: Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-
241/04, ECLI:EU:T:2005:426, European Environmental Bureau; Case T-45/02, 
ECLI:EU:T:2003:127, Dow AgroScience. 
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the unlawful norm, with potentially ruinous consequences, or flout it in the 
hopes that it would be invalidated some years later if the domestic 
enforcement proceedings were referred to the CJEU under Art 267. This 
dilemma, which arose in respect of so-called 'self-executing measures' 26, was 
a clear 'gap' in the EU standing rules. It played, and continues to play for 
reasons that shall be seen, a crucial part in the standing jurisprudence.  
 
B. The Purpose of the Third Head 
Beyond the overall aim of facilitating direct challenges, the exact intended 
scope of the third head is not all that easy to identify.27 This is not the place 
to revisit the copious literature on the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Three 
sources of uncertainty, however, are worthy of note. First, textually, the 
extension of standing is predicated on two terms – regulatory act and 
implementing measures – that were left entirely undefined. Second, 
historically, the third head was lifted verbatim from the failed Constitution 
for Europe. This document had a bold project of restructuring the sources of 
Community law, most notably by creating a new hierarchy of secondary 
norms.28 The Constitution was abandoned after the French and Dutch voters 
rejected it, and the Lisbon Treaty proceeds on a different basis to the 
Constitution for Europe.29 The somewhat farraginous source of the text adds 
another layer of complexity to the interpretation of the third head. Finally, it 
seems probable that the third head was more the product of political 
compromise rather than considered reflection on the exact extent to which 
                                                 
26 See Koen Lenaerts and Nathan Cambien 'Regions and the European Court: Giving 
Shape to the Regional Dimension of the Member States' (2010) EL Rev 609 for a 
short overview. See also discussion in part IV and V.  
27 See the discussion and the sources cited in Jürgen Bast, 'Legal Instruments and 
Judicial Protection' in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds) Principles of 
European Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed (2009, Hart Publishing), 396. 
28 See, generally, Jean-Claude Piris, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis, (2006, 
CUP). See also Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem and Nils Baeten, 'Before the law 
stands a gatekeeper – or what is a 'regulatory act' in Article 263(4)' (2014) Common 
Market Law Review 1187, 1204 – 1212; Cornelia Koch, 'Locus Standi of private 
applicants under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the protection of 
individuals' right to an effective remedy' (2005) ELR 511, 516-527.  
29 See Van Malleghem and Baeten, ibid; Bast, ibid. 
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the standing rules should be liberalised.30 Taken together, the intentions 
being Art 263(4) are rather foggy, and its interpretation far from self-evident. 
 
That said, it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which this is a setback. 
 
At a general level, it left the courts ample room to chart their own course 
through the murky waters of Art 263(4). In effect, the Lisbon reform gave the 
courts a carte blanche to liberalise the standing provisions. The courts could 
have seized on the ambiguity shrouding Art 263(4) to break from their 
notoriously problematic interpretations31 and relax the admissibility criteria 
for direct challenge. Yet, as shall be seen, they did not. It is thus even more 
pressing to explain why, despite a clear opportunity to do so, the courts have 
remained ensconced in their restrictive interpretation. 
 
On a more specific level, while difficult to pinpoint the exact intentions of 
the framers of the Treaty, at the very least, the third head intended to remedy 
the dilemma whereby a party would have to break a provision of EU law in 
order to challenge it. It does so by dispensing with the need to show 
individual concern in relation to regulatory acts that do not entail 
implementing measures.32 It should, however, be borne in mind that it was 
not the only argument in favour of the reforms. So much can be gleaned from 
the working papers of the Constitution for Europe, a key passage of which 
reads: 
 
Members of the circle who were in favour of amending the fourth paragraph 
of Article 230 stressed in particular the fact that, in certain exceptional cases, 
an individual could be directly concerned by an act of general application 
without it entailing an internal implementing measure. In such cases, the 
individual concerned would currently have to infringe the law to have access 
to the court.33 
                                                 
30 See Bast, ibid, 905.  
31 See fn 2. 
32 Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v European 
Commission, [43]; Inuit, fn 12, [57]; Case C-456/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2283, T and L 
Sugars and Another v Commission, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, [24]. 
33 Cover note from the Praesidium to the Convention on the Court of Justice and the 
High Court, CONV 734/03, at p. 20. 
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As shall be seen in part V, there was a wide range of arguments put in favour 
of the relaxation of standing rules – both from sources within the courts and 
in academic writings. It may well have been that, whilst particularly 
concerned about parties caught on the horns of dilemma, the third head was 
intended to achieve an overall liberalisation of the standing rules in order to 
address the wide-ranging concerns. Indeed, as shall been seen, in and of itself, 
there is nothing in the text of the third head that confines it to solving the 
dilemma presented above. This, again, adds greater importance to identifying 
why the courts chose to maintain their restrictive approach.  
 
III. WHY ARE SO FEW DIRECT CHALLENGES ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE 
THIRD HEAD?  
 
1. Implementing Measures 
The courts have given this criterion a formalistic meaning. The mere fact that 
such measures exist renders a claim inadmissible under the third head 
(section A). This, in itself, goes some way in explaining why the third head of 
standing is difficult to satisfy. However, the formalistic interpretation has 
broader consequences which create nearly insuperable barriers to satisfying 
the third head (section B). Nonetheless, it is entirely possible, and indeed 
plausible, to adopt a more liberal approach by considering the substance – 
and not just the existence – of those measures (section C). 
 
A. The Formalistic Interpretation of Implementing Measures 
A case demonstrating the formalism that pervades the interpretation of this 
criterion is T and L, involving a challenge to exceptional import tariffs on 
sugar.34 Under this scheme, national authorities received applications for 
import licences, ensured that the conditions of admissibility were satisfied, 
and notified the Commission of any quantities allowed to be imported. 
Crucially, this scheme left no discretion to the national authorities. Even 
though the parties were required to submit import license applications to the 
national authorities, the latter's involvement was limited to a supervisory 
function. In the words of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, actions carried 
                                                 
34 T and L, fn 12. 
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out by the national authorities were 'taken strictly in the exercise of 
circumscribed powers'.35 
 
As such, the claimants maintained that the actions the national authorities 
were required to carry out under the scheme were not sufficient to amount to 
implementing measures. The national authorities' role as administrators of 
the licensing scheme was vestigial; they simply acted as 'mailboxes' for the 
scheme that was, down to minute detail, the exclusive design of the 
Commission. 
 
The CJEU rejected these submissions. It held that the legal effects of the 
scheme arose only through acts taken by national authorities after the 
undertakings had submitted applications for import licenses. Critically, it 
was irrelevant that these implementing measures were of a 'mechanical' 
nature, or that the national authorities were robotically carrying out the 
detail of the Commission's scheme.36 On the CJEU's analysis, the nature of 
the implementing measures – however technical, ancillary, vestigial, minimal 
or of whatever desired epithet – is irrelevant. This is a mercilessly formalistic 
interpretation, the mere fact they exist precludes reliance on the third head. 
 
Thus, in order to rely on the third head, it is necessary to show that the 
contested measure in and of itself gives rise to the legal effects that are 
complained of. The italicised phrase is key.37 If these effects arise only 
through the medium of national actions – regardless of the extent to which 
national authorities are bound to carry out such actions – then a measure does 
not qualify as one which does not entail implementing measures. This gives 
                                                 
35 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, fn 32 [46]. 
36 ibid, [41]. 
37 Case C-552/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:804, Canon Europa v Commission [48] 'in order to 
determine whether the contested regulation entails implementing measures, it is 
necessary to ascertain whether that regulation, in particular the part of its annex 
concerned by the appellant's imports, determines itself the tariff classification of the 
[printers] imported by Canon Europa' (emphasis added).  
Case T-312/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:472, Federcoopesca and Others v Commission, [28] 'the 
third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU is designed to apply only 
when the disputed act, in itself, in other words irrespective of any implementing 
measures, alters the legal situation of the applicant.' 
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rise to a range of consequences that drastically restrict the scope of the third 
head. Three may be explored in the following section, namely, the limited 
kinds of acts that can be challenged under the third head; the exclusion of 
certain large swathes of EU norms from challenge under the third head; and 
the fact that standing under the third head, in some cases, is even more 
difficult to satisfy than the pre-Lisbon position. 
 
B. The Consequences of Adopting a Formalistic Interpretation  
First, this interpretation drastically restricts the kind of acts that can be challenged 
under the third head. This does not only refer to the fact that almost all 
contested acts will entail implementing measures, as defined by the courts. It 
also refers to the fact that the very kind of measures that can be challenged 
under the third head are of a very limited nature. In practice, so far, only two 
kinds of acts can be found. Naturally, these are not closed categories; they 
may well overlap, and they most likely will be subject to refinement in future 
jurisprudence. At present, however, the two categories presented here best 
capture the existing jurisprudence. 
 
The first are prohibitions. The contested measure says 'Do not do X', and, as 
a result, undertakings in the Member states cannot do X. A good example is 
Bloufin, where the Commission Regulation prohibited the fishing of Bluefin 
tuna in a given geographical area.38 That Regulation gave rise automatically to 
the prohibition of such fishing, without the need for national authorities to 
raise a finger. The claim was admissible.  
 
The second kind are lists, where the very inclusion or non-inclusion on that 
list gives rise to the legal effects complained of. Microban is one example. 
Health Foods, on the marketing of food supplements, provides another.39 The 
Commission established a list of health claims that the European Food and 
Safety Authority had determined were scientifically sound and could be used 
                                                 
38 Case T-367/10 ECLI:EU:T:2013:97, Bloufin and Others v Commission. 
39 Case T-296/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:375, Health Food Manufacturers Association and 
Others v Commission. 
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in adverts to market food supplements.40 The mere fact that a given health 
claim was included, or not included, in this list had the automatic 
consequence of determining whether it could be used for marketing 
purposes. As such, the provision did not entail implementing measures, and 
the claim was admissible. 
 
It is unlikely that the Greek and French purse seiners in Bloufin, or that the 
vitamin manufacturers in Health Foods, would satisfy the requirement of 
individual concern. Prior to Lisbon, under Art 230(4) EC, their claims would 
have been inadmissible. To that extent, it is tempting to see these cases as 
post-Lisbon success stories. This would be misleading. A closer examination 
of the first kind of act reveals that only relatively simple acts can be 
challenged, and the second kind of act involves an element of fortuity as to 
whether it entails implementing measures. 
 
The measures at issue in the first category, must, by their very nature, be 
simple. The contested measure in Bloufin consisted of no more than two 
articles. The measure in Microban was a straightforward declaration that 
triclosan was to be immediately removed from a list of chemicals, coupled 
with a transitional measure to end marketing of triclosan products before a 
given date. Anything beyond such straightforward prohibitions dictated and 
enforced at the EU level alone will most likely entail implementing measures 
of some form. If the measure at issue, for example, envisages a more complex 
scheme rather than a mere prohibition, it will most likely require action to be 
carried out at the national level. As in T and L, it will be insulated from 
challenge on the third head.41 It is therefore only in limited cases that the 
third head will be of practical use. 
 
As to the second category of measures, it is to be borne in mind that the list 
must in and of itself give rise to legal effects complained of. However, it may 
well be fortuitous that the inclusion on a list gives rise to a legal effect without 
                                                 
40 See Regulation No 432/2012, establishing a list of permitted health claims made on 
foods other than those referring to the reduction of disease risk and to children's 
development and health, OJ L 136, 25.5.2012, p. 1–40. 
41 See also, in the next section, the impossibility of challenging customs duties and 
State aid Decisions, both of which have been held to entail implementing measures.  
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implementing measures. Bilbaína, the fourth and final case that succeeded 
under the third head, is a good example. It requires some presentation. 
 
Bilbaína deals with the so-called REACH Regulation.42 REACH lays out a 
comprehensive classification scheme for chemicals, and created the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) to administer it. A crucial part of this 
scheme is to ensure that actors in the chemical supply chains are aware of the 
hazards that certain chemicals may pose. Therefore, producers must provide 
certain information to those actors. The scope of those duties, and the 
information to be provided, depends on the classification of the chemical in 
question. On the facts of Bilbaína, the ECHA held that a tar derivative, 
CTPHT, was a substance of very high concern within the definition of Art 57 
of REACH.43 Following Art 59 of the Regulation, provision was made for all 
substances of very high concern within Art 57, like CTPHT, to be included 
in a list ('Art 59 list'). 
 
The claimants sought to challenge the inclusion of CTPHT on this list. 
Following Art 31, the inclusion in the Art 59 list required them to update the 
information in the safety data sheets provided to actors in the supply chain. 
This updating obligation arose out of the mere fact that the chemical was a 
substance of very high concern. As stipulated in Art 31 (1)(c): 
 
The supplier of a substance or a preparation shall provide the recipient of the 
substance or preparation with a safety data sheet compiled in accordance 
with Annex II (…) where a substance is included in the list established in 
accordance with Article 59(1)44  
 
                                                 
42 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending 
Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC 
and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ 
L 396, 30.12.2006, p.1 – 520  
43 Case T-93/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:106, Bilbaína and Others v ECHA. 
44 See also Art 31(3)(b) and Art 33(1) and (2) which also refer to Art 59.  
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In other words, the updating obligation in Art 31 was in and of itself triggered 
by the mere fact of being included in the Art 59 list. As such, the contested 
ECHA decision produced legal effects in the form of updating obligations 
without the need for implementing measures. 
 
In reality, the litigants' challenge had nothing to do with the updating 
obligations. They sought, rather, to challenge the classification of CTPHT 
substance of very high concern. The updating obligations were simply 
convenient springboards that allowed for direct challenge. It was to some 
extent fortuitous that they could be separated from subsequent stages in the 
authorisation procedure, and as such, entailed no implementing measures.45 
In this light, the litigants were simply fortunate that the idiosyncrasies of the 
Regulation allowed them to 'sever' these obligations from the rest of the 
REACH framework.46 
 
Second, the formalistic reasoning in this area means that entire areas of EU law 
are sealed off from the potential liberalising effects of the third head. Two good 
examples are challenges to customs duties and State aid Decisions. 
 
                                                 
45 See, for example, Bilbaína, fn 43, [64] 'the next stage of the authorisation procedure, 
which consists of the inclusion in order of priority of the candidate substances in 
Annex XIV to Regulation No 1907/2006, that is to say, in the list of substances 
subject to authorisation, is not a measure implementing the contested decision. The 
conclusion of the identification procedure triggers its own information obligations 
which do not depend on the subsequent stages of the authorisation procedure.' 
46 Contrast, for example, T-310/15, ECLI:EU:T:2016:265, European Union Copper Task 
Force v Commission, [57]. The facts are too complex to visit in entirety. In essence, the 
claimant sought the inclusion of copper-based chemicals on a list that would have 
allowed them to be used in plant protection products. The contested norm, which 
placed such chemicals on a list of chemicals for substitution, entailed implementing 
measures because its inclusion on this list, for reasons explained at [57] and elsewhere 
in the judgment, had no bearing on the conduct of the approval renewal procedure 
which lead to the adoption of a regulation by the Commission. The challenge was 
inadmissible. One cannot but note that this turns on the idiosyncrasies of the 
complex web of Regulations, Council Directives, Commission Directives, and 
Commission Implementing Directives in this area.  
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In Canon, the litigants sought to challenge certain changes to the Common 
Customs Tariff bearing on customs duties on multi-purpose printers.47 The 
CJEU stressed that, as far as Canon was concerned, the obligation to pay the 
duties in question arose only after national customs authorities had 
calculated and communicated the sums due. The Common Customs Tariff – 
the contested measure – did not in and of itself give rise to the legal 
consequences complained of. Canon's challenge, as a result, was inadmissible. 
Identical analyses can be found in the context of anti-dumping duties.48 
Canon is representative of most of the other decisions in this area, which have 
also failed for lack of standing.49 Indeed, it now seems a foregone conclusion 
that direct challenges to customs duties on the third head will be 
inadmissible. A number of decisions hold that implementing measures are 
always necessary for a tariff classification to produce legal effects.50 A good 
example is the following extract from the CJEU in Canon:51  
 
The customs system, as instituted by the Customs Code and of which the 
contested regulation forms part, provides that the receipt of duties fixed by 
the latter regulation is carried out, in all cases, on the basis of measures 
adopted by the national authorities. 
 
Similar consequences can be seen in the context of State aid. In Telefónica, the 
claimants were the beneficiaries of a scheme that offered Spanish companies 
certain tax benefits when they acquired foreign shareholdings. The claimant 
sought to contest Commission's finding that found the scheme was 
unlawful.52 The challenge was inadmissible. The Decision was addressed to 
                                                 
47 Case C-552/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:804, Canon Europa v Commission. 
48 Case T-596/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:53, Bricmate AB v Council, [68] – [71]. 
49 Anti-dumping: Case T-596/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:53, Bricmate AB v Council; Case T-
134/10, ECLI:EU:T:2014:143, FESI v Council; Case T-551/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:60, 
Brugola Service International v Council; Case T-507/13, ECLI:EU:T:2015:23, 
SolarWorld AG and Others v Commission.  
Customs challenges: Case C-553/14 P, Kyocera, ECLI:EU:C:2015:805; Case T-380/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:420; Case T-380/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:420, Anonymi Viotechniki; 
Case C-84/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:517, Forgital. 
50 Anonymi Viotechniki, ibid, [32]; Case T-34/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:797, Canon Europa, 
[38]. 
51 Canon Europa, fn 47, [50]. 
52 Telefónica, fn 12.  
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Spain, and imposed no obligation on the claimant beneficiaries. The actual 
effect on a given beneficiary would be determined by a tax notice issued by 
the relevant fiscal authorities. This notice was held to constitute an 
implementing measure within Art 263(4).  
 
So much is confirmed by Altadis, where the parties sought to challenge the 
obligation to recover the unlawful State aid. 53 Again, it was found that the 
Decision did not spell out the amounts of aid to be recovered from a given 
undertaking; these would rather be fleshed out in domestic measures tailored 
to individual beneficiaries. Given the plight of others in this area,54 and the 
statement in Iberdrola that 'all the measures for implementing the 
incompatibility decision' constitute implementing measures,55 it is seems 
that challenges to State aid Decisions on the third head are inadmissible. As 
a result, two entire areas of EU law are isolated from challenge on the third 
head.  
 
Third, the criteria implementing measures has been interpreted so 
restrictively that it is often more difficult to satisfy than individual concern. 
In this light, the third head is sometimes a step back from the position under 
Art 230(4) EC. For example, in Crown Equipment, the claimants sought to 
challenge anti-dumping measures in respect of truck parts manufactured in 
China and Thailand.56 As we saw in Canon, the calculation and 
communication of the amounts owed by the national authorities in Crown 
                                                 
53 Case T-400/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:490, Altadis, SA. 
54 See Case T-221/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:112, Iberdrola; Case T-601/11, ECLI:E 
U:T:2014:839, Dansk Automat Brancheforening; Case T-287/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:60, 
Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH; Case T-620/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:59, GFKL Financial 
Services AG; Case T-694/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:915, European Renewable Energies 
Federation; Case T-670/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:906, Milchindustrie-Verband; Case T-
174/11, ECLI:EU:T:2012:143, Modelo Continente Hipermercados; Case T-488/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:497, Scheepsbouwkundig Advies- en Rekencentrum (Note, this party 
had standing on the basis of procedural rights and could challenge the decision only 
to the extent that it infringed those rights. It did not succeed in showing standing 
within the heads of Art 263(4), allowing it to challenge the merits of that decision); 
Case T-118/13, ECLI:EU:T:2016:365, Whirlpool Europe v Commission.  
55 Case T-221/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:112, Iberdrola v Commission, [46] – [47]. 
56 Case T-643/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1076, Crown Equipment. 
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Equipment would constitute implementing measures. As such, the claimants 
would not have been able to rely on the third head. 
 
Although they did not satisfy the third head, the General Court found that 
the second head was satisfied. They were directly concerned, first, given that 
the contested regulation affected their legal situation by imposing duties on 
the products they sought to import, and, second, given that the Member 
States had no discretion as regards the imposition and extent of the duty.57 
They were also individually concerned in that they were identified in the 
contested measure and were involved in the preliminary investigations. 
 
It is noteworthy that, as in other cases58, the General Court did not even 
consider the third head. It is, surely, indicative of the restrictiveness of the 
third head that the notoriously narrow second head is used as the courts' first 
port of call.  
 
This is not an isolated case that turned on the quirks of the challenge in Crown 
Equipment. It is a widespread phenomenon, with many litigants satisfying the 
second head of standing but not the third.59 Lest it be objected that individual 
                                                 
57 See fn 9 and 10. 
58 Case T-287/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:60, Heitkamp BauHolding v Commission, [59] ('Since 
the applicant's direct concern is established, it is appropriate to check whether the 
applicant is also individually concerned by the contested decision, without it being 
necessary, if so, to check whether the contested decision is a regulatory act that does 
not entail implementing measures.'); Case T-620/11, ECLI:EU:T:2016:59, GFKL 
Financial Services AG, [53]; Case T-483/11 , ECLI:EU:T:2013:407, Sepro v Commission, 
[31]. 
59 See also Case T-614/13, ECLI:EU:T:2014:835, Romonta v Commission; Case T-512/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, Front Polisario v Council; Case T-643/11, ECLI:EU:T: 
2014:1076, Crown Equipment; Case T-17/12, ECLI:EU:T:2014:234, Hagenmeyer and 
Hahn v Commission; Case T-385/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:7, BP Products v Commission; 
Case T-57/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021, Castelnou v Commission; Case T-620/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:59, GFKL Financial Services AG; Case T-287/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:60, Heitkamp BauHolding; Case T-462/13, ECLI:EU:T:2015:902, 
Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco; T-276/13, ECLI:EU:T:2016:340, Growth Energy, 
and Renewable Fuels Association v Council; Case T-277/13, ECLI:EU:T:2016:343, 
Marquis Energy v Council; Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, Stichting Woonpunt 
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concern is generally taken as being generally easier to satisfy in the context of 
anti-dumping, other examples can readily be found ranging from challenges 
to the greenhouse gas emissions allocation system60 to challenges to 
liberalisation measures on agricultural products with third party countries.61 
As a result, despite the seeming success of Microban and its lucky sisters 
Bloufin, Bilbaína and Health Foods, the third head is to some extent even more 
restrictive than the pre-Lisbon position. 
 
C. The Substantive Interpretation of Implementing Measures 
However, 'implementing measures' does not need to be given such a 
restrictive interpretation. The courts could easily engage in a more 
substantive analysis to determine whether a contested norm entails 
implementing measures. 
 
The text of Art 263(4), in some linguistic versions, seems to imply a higher 
threshold than there merely 'being' implementing measures. The notion of a 
norm 'entailing' implementing measures imports a logical or causal link 
between the contested norm and the implementing measures. Simply 
pointing to the fact that such norms exist would not necessarily satisfy this 
requirement. Other language versions, like the German and Hungarian, seem 
to also require this superadded element.62 Granted, other linguistic versions 
simply require the contested norm to 'include' implementing measures.63 
That said, the ambiguity between these two versions could be used as a 
springboard toward a more substantive inquiry. 
 
                                                 
and Others v European Commission for examples of satisfying the second head but not 
the third.  
60 Romonta, fn 59. 
61 Polisario, fn 59. 
62 See, in German, 'Rechtsakte mit Verordnungscharakter, die sie unmittelbar 
betreffen und keine Durchführungsmaßnahmen nach sich ziehen, Klage erheben', 
and, in Hungarian 'közvetlenül érintő olyan rendeleti jellegű jogi aktusok ellen, 
amelyek nem vonnak maguk után végrehajtási intézkedéseket'. I am grateful to Julia 
Bihary, Julia Weber and Katharina Zwins for discussion on this matter.  
63 See, in Spanish, 'los actos reglamentarios que la afecten directamente y que no 
incluyan medidas de ejecución', or in French, 'les actes réglementaires qui la 
concernent directement et qui ne comportent pas de mesures d'exécution.'. 
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Advocate General Cruz Villalón in T and L offered a framework for such a 
substantive inquiry. He opined that 'non-substantive or ancillary measures'64 
should not constitute implementing measures. The courts should rather 
consider whether the contested norm is 'fully and autonomously operational' 
in light of its purpose, content and effects on the applicant's legal situation.65 
If so, the criterion of implementing measures is satisfied. 
 
Thus, on the facts of T and L, the Advocate General concluded that the 
contested measure did not entail implementing measures. His argument can 
be best understood as turning on a separation between a 'high level' or 
'general' challenge to the scheme itself and a 'low level' or 'specific' challenge 
to its administration. The claimants argued that the scheme itself placed 
them at a competitive disadvantage as compared with national sugar beet 
producers, and was contrary to the principles of non-discrimination, 
legitimate expectations and proportionality. From this perspective, the fact 
that the administration of the scheme required the exercise of implementing 
powers was immaterial. Functionally, the challenged measure – the scheme 
itself – was autonomous and operational without the need for further State 
measures.  
 
I note finally that this analysis seems entirely consistent, if not required, by 
the courts' frequent assertions that 'reference should be made exclusively to 
the subject-matter of the action' when determining whether the contested 
norm entails implementing measures.66 
 
This analysis can usefully be applied to the two areas examined above that are, 
at present, excluded from the liberalising effects of the third head. 
 
In the field of custom duties, it would be entirely possible to consider that 
the calculation and the communication of the duties are purely ancillary or 
accessory measures to the contested norm. They are the immediate 
consequences of the change to the Common Customs Tariff. Member States 
                                                 
64 Advocate General Cruz Villalón, fn 32, at [32]. 
65 ibid, at [32]. 
66 Telefónica, fn 12, [31]; DanskAutomat, fn 54, [57]; Woonpunt, fn 31, [38]; European 
Union Copper Task Force, fn 46, [37]. 
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have no discretion in the calculation or imposition of those duties; their 
national customs authorities act, in effect, as agents of the EU. The national 
measures are not implementing measures of substance. They are formal 
measures that simply give effect to the Common Customs Tariff designed by 
the EU institutions. 
 
Similar conclusions can be reached in respect of State aid Decisions.67 As has 
been observed, the actions carried out by the Member States to recover the 
unlawful aid amount to implementing measures. Yet these actions – the 
recovery of the aid – are the logical consequences of the finding that the aid 
is unlawful.68 Short of absolute impossibility, the Member State must 
imperatively recover the full value of the aid. In that sense, the Commission's 
decision is autonomous; the natural legal corollary of the finding that the aid 
is unlawful is its recovery by national authorities. In this light, the actions 
carried out by the national authorities are ancillary to the declaration that the 
aid was unlawful. They are formal acts guided entirely by the terms of the 
contested Decision, not substantive measures necessary to implement some 
broader design of the EU institutions. 
 
2. Direct Concern 
Direct concern means what it did prior to the Lisbon reforms. 69 This seems 
correct as a matter of interpretation. The framers kept the notion of 'direct 
concern', even though they would have been aware of other, more liberal, 
formulations.70 As above, the intention seems to have been to liberalise 
                                                 
67 Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:335, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, 
Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, [77]. 
68 For example, Case C-331/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:250, Commission v Poland, [54]. 
69 Case T-694/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:915, EREF v Commission, [17]; Case T‑312/14, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:472, Federcoopesca; Microban, fn 18 at [32]; T and L, fn 12 [37]; Case 
T-673/13, ECR, EU:T:2015:167, European Coalition to End Animal Experiments v 
ECHA, [67]. Case C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:21, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v 
Parliament and Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott [68] – [69] and Case 
C‑274/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:204, Telefónica SA v European Commission at [59]; 
Advocate General Wathelet in Woonpunt, fn 67, [66].  
70 See, for example, Case C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, Unión de Pequeños Agricoltres 
v Council, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs; Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v 
Commission. 
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standing rules by dispensing with the need to show individual concern rather 
than diluting the notion of direct concern.71  
 
As far as the scope of the third head goes, the issue with direct concern is not 
that the courts have failed to depart from their pre-Lisbon definitions. 
Rather, the issue is that they have insisted on a watertight separation between 
the second sub-criterion of direct concern72 and the criterion of 'not entailing 
implementing measures'. As shall be explained, the courts adamantly 
maintain that the contested measure must produce effects without the need 
for intermediate rules – part of the second sub-criterion for direct concern – 
and must also be free of implementing measures. They refuse to engage, on any 
meaningful level, with the possibility of there being some interplay, let alone 
some overlap, between these two notions. 
This accounts for the ineffectiveness of the third head in two ways. First, the 
courts, in fleshing out the factors that distinguish the two notions, confirm 
its literal interpretation of 'implementing measures'. Second, the distinction 
forces parties to overcome two separate obstacles – both the second sub-
criterion of direct concern and the criterion of not 'entailing implementing 
measures'. However, this distinction is less convincing than it initially might 
appear. It is not a given that they represent two separate standing hurdles. 
When examined closer, they shade into each other on a number of levels: 
practical, analytical and conceptual. The courts' refusal to engage with this 
interplay reduces the possibility of direct challenges under the third head. 
 
A. The Rigid Distinction Between 'Not Entailing Implementing Measures' 
and 'Direct Concern' 
The courts' hermetic separation between the two notions is readily 
demonstrated by the CJEU's decision in Forgital.73 At issue was a challenge to 
customs duties on titanium-based products. The claim failed in the General 
                                                 
71 See Advocate General Cruz Villalón, fn 32, [26]; Federcoopesca, fn 37, [26]; Inuit, fn 12 
[57]; see fn 32.  
72 I recall that this means that the implementation of that measure must be purely 
automatic, resulting from Union norms without the application of other 
intermediate rules, see part II.  
73 Forgital, fn 49. 
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Court because, as above, the calculation and communication of those duties 
by the national authorities amounted to implementing measures.74 
 
On appeal, it was argued that the General Court erred in finding that 'not 
entailing implementing measures' was a separate criterion to that of 'direct 
concern'.75 The CJEU tersely dismissed the argument and simply asserted 
that the two criteria are indeed distinct and separate questions. The sole 
differentiating factor given in that case was that the absence of discretion is 
'not relevant to the question of whether the measure entails implementing 
acts or not'76 This enigmatic statement fails to address the substance of the 
distinction between the two notions, or the relationship between the two 
admissibility criteria. 
 
Some digging reveals four arguments that the courts use on a routine basis in 
order to delineate direct concern from implementing measures, including the 
justification offered in Forgital.  
 
First, perhaps most obviously, the courts rely on the wording. The framers 
introduced two different phrases. The framers of Art 263(4) would not have 
used the term 'implementing measures' if it were not an additional criterion 
to the need to show direct concern.77 However, the semantic difference 
between the two concepts is misleading. Linguistically, the formulations of 
the second sub-criterion (in terms of absence of 'intermediate measures') and 
the requirement that the contested norm not entail implementing measures 
                                                 
74 T- 438/10, ECLI:EU:T:2013:648, Forgital v Commission. 
75 Forgital, fn 49, [39]. 
76 ibid, [43] and [44] (In French only, but the author's translation would be as follows) 
'Contrary to the applicant's submissions, the condition pertaining to the absence of 
implementing measures is separate to that of direct concern. (…) the question of 
whether the contested measure confers an element of discretion on national 
authorities responsible for the implementing measures it not relevant to the 
question of whether the measure entails implementing measures or not'; see also 
Case T-381/11, ECLI:EU:T:2012:273, Eurofer v Commission, [59]; Case T-551/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:60, BSI v Council; Case T-400/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:490, Altadis v 
Commission, [50]. 
77 See, for example, Bricmate fn 49, [74]; Federcoopesca, fn 37, [31]. 
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bear striking similarity.78 Moreover, as shall be seen, the textual difference 
between the two notions is far less convincing in light of the practical, 
analytical and conceptual proximity between the two.  
 
Beyond the wording itself, the courts insist on the rigid separation between 
the two notions by stating that what is relevant to the question of direct 
concern is irrelevant to the question of whether the contested norm entails 
implementing measures. Thus, 
 
1. 'The allegedly mechanical nature [emphasis added] of the measures taken at 
national level … is irrelevant in ascertaining whether those regulations entail 
implementing measures' 79 
2. 'The question of whether or not the addressee of the contested decision has 
discretion [emphasis added] in implementing the disputed act has no bearing 
on …. the existence of implementing measures, such existence being 
sufficient to render the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU inapplicable'80 
3. '[The fact that the contested measure] is directly applicable [emphasis added] 
in the Member States and that, as a consequence, it directly affects [the 
claimant's] legal position in that it alters it without the need for national 
implementing measures or measures adopted by the EU institutions (…) is 
relevant only as regards the circumstances in which an applicant can be said 
to be directly concerned, and must therefore be disregarded [in relation to 
the consideration of implementing measures]'81 
 
Thus, the mechanical nature of the implementing measures, the margin of 
discretion left to national authorities, the direct applicability of the contested 
measure are all irrelevant to whether a norm entails implementing measures. 
These questions of mechanics, discretion and direct applicability rather bear 
                                                 
78 See other language versions. German 'ohne dass weitere Durchführungsvorschriften 
angewandt werden' and 'keine Durchführungsmaßnahmen nach sich ziehen'; Maltese 
'mingħajr applikazzjoni ta' regoli oħra intermedjarji' and 'li ma jinvolvix miżuri ta' 
implimentazzjoni'. 
79 T & L Sugars, fn 12, [41] – [42]; Canon, fn 47, [47]; Kyocera, fn 49, [46]; Case T-507/13, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:23, SolarWorld AG, [36] and [60]. See section three of this Part.  
80 Federcoopesca, fn 37, [41]. 
81 Kyocera, fn 49, [49]; Case T-134/10, ECLI:EU:T:2014:143, FESI, fn 49, [28] – [29]; 
Case T-380/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:420, Anonymi Viotechniki, [44]. 
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on whether the contested norm is of direct concern to the applicant. The 
listing of such factors which are relevant to direct concern but not to 
implementing measures provides the basis for the courts' repeated assertions 
that the two notions are distinct, cumulative standing criteria. 82 
 
This reasoning does not just facilitate formalistic interpretation of 
implementing measures; it positively requires such an interpretation. It 
precludes any substantive analysis of whether the measures in question are 
mechanical, or constitute actions over which the national authorities had no 
discretion. The inquiry is thus limited to the purely formal question of 
whether such measures exist. 'Implementing measures' is given an overly 
broad interpretation, which not only reinforces the reasoning examined in 
the previous section, but, more broadly, contributes to the limited 
effectiveness of the third head. 
 
In and of itself, this is not an impermissible interpretation. I do not cavil, 
from a purely textual point of view, the possibility of endorsing such 
reasoning. But it must be recognised that this is not the only interpretation. 
Nor is it necessarily a desirable. Indeed, it is entirely coherent to adopt a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between direct concern and 
implementing measures. So much is evidenced by considering the practical, 
analytical and conceptual overlap between the two notions, as shall be 
demonstrated in the following section. 
 
B. The Questionable Distinction Between 'Not Entailing Implementing 
Measures' and 'Direct Concern' 
The practical similarity is best demonstrated by reference to the Woonpunt 
case.83 Here, the litigants were able to satisfy the second head of standing, but 
not the third. At issue was an existing aid scheme for 'Wocos' – Dutch non-
profit property organisations carrying out a mix of commercial activities and 
social housing programmes. The Commission recommended a number of 
appropriate measures to the Netherlands in order for to bring the scheme 
                                                 
82 See, for example, SolarWorld, fn 79, [36]; Eurofer, fn 76, [59]; Altadis, fn 76, [47]; BSI v 
Council, fn 49, [56].  
83 Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:100, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v 
Commission. 
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into line with the prohibition on unlawful State aid. In response, the 
Netherlands made a commitment to promulgate an updated scheme – in the 
form of a ministerial decree and a new Housing Law – that would address the 
Commission's concerns. The Commission accepted the proposed 
amendments in a Decision which the applicants sought to contest. This 
contested Decision, it should be noted, had the effect of requiring the Dutch 
state to bring the said amendments into being.84  
 
As to the third head, the contested Decision noted that the updated scheme 
would be implemented by way of a new ministerial decree and a new Housing 
Law.85 The CJEU understood this to mean that the legal consequences 
complained of would materialize not through the contested Decision itself, 
but through these Dutch measures. Accordingly, the contested Decision 
entailed implementing measures. 
 
However, the applicants could avail themselves of the second head.86 The 
court reiterated that the second sub-criterion of direct concern requires the 
legal effects complained of to be 'purely automatic' and 'without the 
application of other intermediate rules'. They were satisfied. Once the 
Commission accepted the Dutch proposals for the updated scheme, they 
were bound to bring it into force. The fact that they had no discretion in this 
regard meant the applicant Wocos were directly concerned. 
 
Thus, the CJEU accepted, in the same case, that the enactment of the 
housing policy resulted from Union rules without the need for intermediate 
                                                 
84 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1–9, Art 19(1) 
on 'legal consequences of a proposal for appropriate measures', reads 'The Member 
State shall be bound by its acceptance to implement the appropriate measures'. 
85 Art 41 of the contested Decision read 'The Netherlands authorities have made 
commitments to amend the functioning of wocos and the measures favouring them 
(…) The new rules will be implemented by way of a new ministerial decree from 1 January 
2010 and a new housing Law from 1 January 2011. (...)'. 
86 They were also individually concerned because they were part of a closed and 
countable class of Wocos, established by Royal Decree, in contradistinction to the 
many future Wocos that might come into existence in the future and not enjoy the 
more liberal former scheme. See fn 213.  
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rules87, and that very same housing policy amounted to an implementing 
measure. In other words, it was satisfied that there were no 'intermediate 
rules' but that there were nonetheless 'implementing measures'. This seems 
illogical. By the same token, it would have been entirely possible to consider 
that the contested Decision, in accepting the Dutch undertakings, required 
no implementing measures to produce the legal effects complained of given 
that the Dutch state was obliged to bring the updated scheme into force. 
Practically, therefore, it is difficult to see a rigid distinction between 
implementing measures and direct concern.88  
 
The two notions also shade into each other on an analytical level. In short, the 
analysis that the courts perform in relation to the question of whether a 
measure entails implementing measures is virtually identical as to whether a 
party satisfies the second sub-criterion of direct concern. 
 
In Microban, the General Court reasoned that direct concern was satisfied 
because the prohibition was 'automatic and mandatory'. Moreover, the fact 
that there was a transitional period for the Member States to require the 
cessation of marketing triclosan did not alter this. Although the Member 
States were free to choose when to prohibit the marketing of triclosan within 
that period, they nonetheless had no discretion as to bringing that ban into 
effect. To that extent, reasons the court, this transitional period was 
'ancillary' to the contested prohibition, and direct concern was satisfied.89 It 
then repeats a near-identical analysis in relation to the whether the provision 
entailed implementing measures. The court holds, first, that the ban had the 
'immediate consequence' of not being able to use triclosan in products 
coming into contact with foodstuffs and, second, that the transitional period 
provided for the contested measure was introduced as an 'ancillary measure' 
                                                 
87 See fn 8. 
88 Indeed, see also Case C‑142/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:163, SolarWorld, [35] where the 
CJEU was unable to ascertain whether the appellant was criticizing the General 
Court's consideration of implementing measures or direct concern. ' (…) it is difficult 
to determine with certainty whether, by the first limb of the single ground of appeal, 
the appellant wishes to contest the General Court's assessment of the criterion of 
lack of discretion or its assessment of the lack of implementing measures'. 
89 Microban, fn 18, [29]. 
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to the ban. The key considerations in relation to both criteria – 
'automatic'/'immediate' and 'ancillary' – are very similar. 
 
Many other examples could be given, one of which is Les Verts.90 This case 
was decided in 1986, well before the advent of the third head in the Lisbon 
Treaty. A fuller presentation of the facts is given subsequently, and, for now, 
we may limit ourselves to the court's analysis of whether the claimant French 
Green Party was directly concerned. The court stated that the contested 
norms were 'a complete set of rules which are sufficient in themselves and 
which require no implementing provisions'. It also stressed that the rules 
were 'automatic and leave no room for any discretion'.91 As such, the 
claimants were directly concerned by the contested norms. 
 
How, one might ask, is this 'direct concern' analysis different from the 
analysis that the courts would now perform in relation to whether a measure 
entails implementing measures? The reference to 'implementing provisions' 
harks forward to the post-Lisbon criterion of 'implementing measures'. 
Moreover, the fact that Les Verts the references to the 'automatic' nature of 
the contested provisions and that they were 'sufficient in themselves' to give 
rise to legal effects is also an indication that, in post-Lisbon parlance, the 
provisions did not entail implementing measures. These are conspicuous 
indications that the analysis of what constitutes direct concern is very similar 
to the analysis of whether a contested norm entails implementing measures. 
If we compare the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon consideration of whether a 
party is directly concerned, it is nearly identical to the consideration of 
whether the contested norm entails implementing measures – the analysis of 
whether a contested norm directly concerns a given claimant can very easily 
pass as an 'implementing measures' analysis. Analytically, therefore, the rigid 
distinction between the two is more difficult accept than initially appears.  
 
Finally, on a conceptual level, it is entirely possible to accept that there is some 
degree of overlap between the two notions. The exact scope of this overlap is 
a question of degree.  
 
                                                 
90 Case C-294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, Les Verts v Parliament. 
91 ibid, [31]. 
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On the one hand, it is possible to consider the two notions as identical. 
Advocate General Wathelet was of this opinion in the Woonpunt case. He 
considered that not entailing implementing measures was not a separate 
condition but an explanation of direct concern.92 He was concerned that the 
very purpose of relaxing the standing rules would be frustrated if 'simple 
formalities' like publications, notifications and confirmations could preclude 
a party's reliance on the third head of standing.93 Thus, measures adopted by 
national authorities in the absence of discretion should not constitute 
implementing measures, but that the very notion of absence State discretion 
satisfies both the second criteria of direct concern and means that there are 
no implementing measures.94  
 
On the other, it is possible to endorse a more modest view of the overlap 
between the two notions. Thus, Advocate General Kokott in Telefónica was 
of the opinion that the two are distinct criteria, but, it seems, also of the 
opinion that direct concern would be satisfied as a matter of principle when 
a measure did not entail implementing measures. Her reasoning was that acts 
that fulfil the second criteria of direct concern 'always operate automatically 
and their legal effect ensues from EU rules only'.95 The reasoning was not 
endorsed in Telefónica, which did not address the question of whether the 
claimants were directly concerned. However, parts of Federcoopesca follow a 
line of reasoning similar to Kokott's Opinion. The General Court stated that 
where the contested norm gave rise in and of itself to the legal effects, which 
means that it entails no implementing measures, the criterion of direct 
concern would necessarily be satisfied.96 The case does not seem to have been 
followed further on this point, and, to that extent, seems to be somewhat of 
an outlier in the post-Lisbon jurisprudence. 
                                                 
92 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, fn 67, [69]. 
93 ibid, [72]. 
94 ibid, [75]. 
95 Case C-274/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:204, Telefónica v Commission, Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, [60] 'The second condition is based on the assumption 
that the contested legal act still requires implementation. However, that is 
specifically not so in the case of an act which does not entail implementing measures. 
Such acts always operate automatically and their legal effects ensue from EU rules 
only'. 
96 Federcoopesca, fn 37, [34] and [37]. 
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Again, as was the case in relation to the interpretation of 'implementing 
measures', the courts could easily have adopted a more fluid understanding of 
the relationship between direct concern and implementing measures. Yet 
they chose not to. Rather than insisting on a rigid separation between the two 
they could have embraced the possibility of the two criteria overlapping. 
Their refusal to do so forces them to adopt a purely formal conception of 
implementing measures. The courts' zealous attempts to distinguish the two 
requires them to insist that considerations of mechanics, discretion and 
direct applicability are solely relevant to direct concern and not 
implementing measures. This cements their view that the mere existence of 
implementing measures – regardless of their purpose effect or content – 
precludes reliance on the third head. In turn, this limits the extent to which 
the third head has facilitated direct challenges.  
 
3. Regulatory Act 
As above, there are two elements to the notion of a regulatory act: the 
measure must be non-legislative, and it must be of general application. As the 
criteria raise different issues, it is worth separating the analysis along those 
lines. 
 
A. General Application 
It is not clear what 'general application' means. The case law often disposes 
of the third head of standing on other grounds.97 As a result, we do not have a 
wide range of cases that consider and apply this criterion and it is difficult, at 
present, to ascertain exactly what it might mean. On a broader level, the cases 
that do address the matter do not offer much guidance. So much can be seen 
in the jurisprudence on challenges in the field of anti-dumping duties. The 
Regulations that impose such duties have been held to constitute regulatory 
                                                 
97 Case C-274/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:852, Telefónica v Commission, [38]; Case T-24/11, 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:403, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, [41]; Iberdrola, fn 54, [48] 'It 
follows that the contested decision entails implementing measures and that 
therefore, without it being necessary to rule on whether that decision is a regulatory 
act, the Court must reject the applicant's argument submitted in the alternative, 
based on the last part of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU' 
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acts.98 The reasoning is scant. The courts simply reiterate the Inuit definition 
to the effect that an act is of general application 'in that it applies to 
objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to 
categories of persons envisaged in general and in the abstract', and state that 
the Regulation in question meets this definition.99 
 
It is a shame that the courts do not address the matter in greater detail. The 
classification of such Regulations is, in fact, more complex than the courts 
seem to admit. For example, anti-dumping duties impose both broad duties 
on a given type of products manufactured in a non-EU country, as well as, 
possibly, more tailored duties on individual exporters. As a result, it is not 
given that every obligation under the Regulation necessarily partakes of this 
'general' character.100 Indeed, the Commission's acceptance of undertakings 
from exporters, which confers an exemption from the duties, has been found 
to represent a series of dealings with individual operators, and, by that token, 
does not qualify as an act of general application.101 A fuller discussion of what 
exactly, qualifies a measure as general is thus awaited. 
 
That said, some guidance on the meaning of 'general application' can be 
scoured from the case law, mostly in the field of State aid.102 In Mory, the 
applicant sought to contest the Commission's finding that France did not 
                                                 
98 Case T-596/11, EU:T:2014:53, Bricmate v Council, [65]; Case T-134/10, EU:T:2014:143, 
FESI v Council, [24]. Note both failed to satisfy the third head because of the 
presence of implementing measures.  
99 Bricmate, fn 49, [65]; BSI, fn 49, [43]; FESI, fn 49, [24]; SolarWorld AG, fn 79, [64]. 
100 Michael Rhimes, 'Nothing ado about much? Challenges to Anti-Dumping Measures 
After the Lisbon Reforms to Art 263(4) TFEU' (2016) European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 374; Alexander Kornezov, 'Shaping the new architecture of the EU 
system of judicial remedies; comment on Inuit', (2014) European Law Review 251, 
256-7; Albertina Albors-Lorens, 'Remedies against the EU institutions after Lisbon: 
an era of opportunity?' (2012) CLJ 507, 525-526; Ivo Van Bael and Jean-François Bellis, 
EU Anti-dumping and Other Trade Defence Instruments, 5th Ed., (Kluwer, 2011), 606. 
101 SolarWorld AG, fn 79, [64]. Upheld on appeal in C-142/15 P,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:163. 
102 There are also some interesting insights to be garnered from the case law on 
challenges to the inclusion in various blacklists relating to the financing of terrorism 
and nuclear proliferation. However, space precludes the discussion of these factually 
and technically complicated cases. The reader is directed to Case T-67/12, 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:348, Sina Bank and the case law cited there.  
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need to recover State aid granted to its competitor, Sernam, after Sernam was 
purchased, in administration, by third company.103 The pertinent reasoning 
is contained in this short passage: 
  
As the decision at issue, which was addressed to the French Republic, does 
not constitute a regulatory act under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU, since it is not an act of general application, it is necessary to 
determine whether the appellants are directly and individually concerned by 
that decision, within the meaning of that provision.104 
 
The natural reading of the paragraph suggests that the measure was not of 
general application because it was only addressed to the French Republic. 
This defines very tightly the notion of 'regulatory act', as it seems to imply 
that a measure cannot be 'general' if addressed to only one Member State. 
This would be an alarming result, and the reasoning should not be followed. 
 
There are indications that it will not be. Advocate General Mengozzi in his 
Opinion simply states that 'the decision at issue is not a regulatory act within 
the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU because it is not of 
general application'.105 His Opinion makes no reference to the Decision 
being addressed to the French Republic alone. As such, his Opinion does not 
support the narrowness of the CJEU's approach. It allows us to explain the 
result in Mory on the basis that the Decision in issue was confined to two 
individual companies. That Decision was limited to a finding that there was 
insufficient economic continuity between Sernam and the third company 
that purchased it to require the recovery of aid granted to Sernam. This is a 
                                                 
103 Case C-33/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:609, Mory v Commission. 
104 ibid, [92] There is a citation in this paragraph to Inuit fn 12, [56] which has been 
omitted for readability. This reference is baffling. Paragraph 56 of Inuit stated that 
the concept of acts in Art 263 TFEU, in general, refers to 'any European Union act 
which produces binding legal effects', and that this term 'covers acts of general 
application, legislative or otherwise, and individual acts.'. This is of very limited, if 
any, relevance to interpretation of regulatory act in Art 263(4). The Opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi makes reference to [51], [60], [61] of Inuit, which 
correctly identifies the parts of the judgment that hold that legislative acts are 
excluded from regulatory acts.  
105 Case C-33/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:409, Mory, Opinion of Advocate General 
Mengozzi, [167]. 
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much more satisfactory explanation of the case. It coherently explains why 
the Decision was not of general application. More importantly, it does not 
preclude reliance on the third head simply because only one State is addressed 
in a contested Decision.  
 
Moving beyond the facts of Mory, it is possible to consider the 'standard' 
State aid Decisions which require a Member State to reclaim aid unlawfully 
granted as being of general application. Advocate General Kokott in her 
Opinion for Telefónica drew a distinction between an act being binding on one 
Member State alone, and an act having general application.106 On this basis, the 
fact that the contested Decision bound only one Member State did not mean 
that it was not a regulatory act. On the contrary, it was binding on all organs 
of that State and had the effect of shaping the national legal order.107 It was 
therefore capable of being of general application, and she concluded that the 
Commission Decision constituted a regulatory act. 
    
It is difficult to see whether the courts have adopted this approach. The cases 
do not speak with one voice. On the one hand, Castelnou108 seems to suggest 
that a regulatory act must refer to a class defined by general characteristics. 
On the other, EGBA109 offers a more indulgent approach.  
  
In Castelnou, the Spanish state facilitated the consumption of Spanish coal by 
designating ten companies in a Royal Decree to produce energy from such 
fuels. The Commission issued a Decision confirming the lawfulness of this 
scheme. The challenge, brought by a company who was not designated in that 
Royal Decree, was inadmissible because that Decision was not of general 
application. The beneficiaries of the aid were those designated by the 
Decree, and not defined generally (e.g. all energy plants of certain 
specifications). This suggests a rigid approach whereby any act that does not 
refer to a class defined by general characteristics cannot be a regulatory act. 
 
                                                 
106 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, fn 95, [23]. 
107 ibid, [25]. 
108 Case T-57/11, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021, Castelnou Energía v Commission; see also 
Whirlpool, fn 54, [41]. 
109 Case T- 238/14, ECLI:EU:T:2016:259, EGBA and RGA v Commission. 
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By contrast, in EGBA, the French State imposed a parafiscal levy on the 
revenue from online horse-race betting, which the Commission found was 
justified in light of its benefit for the equine industry. The beneficiaries of 
this levy were the 51 companies that formed part of the economic interest 
group PMU. The General Court accepted that the beneficiaries of the aid 
were not defined generally and in the abstract; it was limited to the 51 specific 
companies that constituted PMU. However, the General Court stressed that 
the challenge was to the method of financing the aid, the parafiscal levy. It 
also accepted that because the levy could affect all online horse-race betting 
operators in France, and the levy was raised on each online horse race betting 
stake, it produced both general effects and applied to objectively determined 
situations.110 In short, the fact that the class of beneficiaries is not envisaged 
in general and in the abstract did not preclude the measure being regulatory. 
 
The tension can be better appreciated by applying the EGBA reasoning to 
Castelnou. One might argue that, despite the fact that ten beneficiaries were 
limited by the Royal Decree, the effects of the Decision were of general 
application. One might point to the fact that the contested scheme affected 
a class of energy producers envisaged in the abstract – those fuel-oil, coal-
fired plants and gas plants whose energy production was disadvantaged in 
comparison with energy produced from Spanish coal.111 The detailed rules 
laid down in the subject of the Decision, like the parafiscal levy at issue in 
EGBA, could also mean that it applies to situations which are determined 
objectively.112 The mere fact that the beneficiaries were defined by Royal 
Decree does not affect this conclusion. An act can have legal effects on a class 
of persons defined in general and in abstract, even though the beneficiaries of 
the aid are no so defined.  
 
                                                 
110 ibid [34] - [35]. 
111 See Decision C (2010) 4499, State aid No N 178/2010 'Public service compensation 
linked to a preferential dispatch mechanism for indigenous coal power plants', [35] – 
[42] for a detailed description of the scheme: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/cases/236267/236267_1150043_151_1.pdf 
112 See Real Decreto 1221/2010, Boletíin Oficial del Estado, Number 239, Section I, page 
83983. 
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In short, one reaches different conclusions as to the general nature of the act 
depending on whether one considers the beneficiaries of the aid or the effects 
of that aid. Castelnou confines itself to the former, and it concludes that the 
act in question is not regulatory. EGBA goes beyond the definition of the 
beneficiaries, and considers the effects themselves. Classifying a given act as 
'general' or 'individual' is not as easy as it might initially seem. There seems to 
be a spectrum of generality, and not a binary opposition of 'general' and 
'individual'. What, one might ask, is sufficiently general to constitute a 
regulatory act? To what extent must a norm 'shape a national legal order' in 
order to be of general application?113 
  
Overall, the courts' standard reference to 'of general application' thus 
requires further refinement. At present, it does not explain what actually is of 
general application, and it fails to appreciate that the scope of application of 
a given norm cannot always be readily classified as 'general' or 'individual'. 
What may be considered individual – specific aid granted to 10 energy 
companies or 51 horse-betting companies – may well be general when seen in 
another light. Perhaps the notion of what is sufficiently general may be given 
different meanings in different contexts – rather like the varying shades of 
meaning attributed to individual concern in different areas of EU law.114 It is 
premature to make any firm conclusions at present, but one hopes that the 
courts will recognise the complexity of this notion, and will flesh out more 
helpful guidelines to determine whether a given act is general or not. 
  
B. Non-legislative 
Only non-legislative acts can be regulatory. It is not possible to offer full 
accounts of all the intricacies of what constitutes a non-legislative act, or all 
the possible interpretations of the term regulatory.115 However, an overall 
                                                 
113 See fn 107. 
114 See Lenaerts and Others, fn 5. 
115 The reader is referred to Jürgen Bast, 'New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon 
Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law' (2012) CMLR 885; Carl 
Bergstrom, 'Defending restricted standing for individual to bring direct actions 
against 'legislative' measures', (2014) European Constitutional law Review 481; 
Christoph Werkmeister and others, 'Regulatory Acts within Art 263(4) TFEU: A 
Dissonant Extension of Locus Standi for Private Applicants' (2011) CYELS 311; Koen 
Lenaerts and Nathan Cambien 'Regions and the European Court: Giving Shape to 
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examination of the bases of the courts' reasoning confirms a trend that has 
been observed before. The courts could adopt an interpretation that would 
allow for broader standing rules, but choose not to. 
  
The CJEU provided three strands of reasoning in Inuit to support the 
contention that 'regulatory act' excludes legislative measures. Teleologically, 
the insertion of an additional paragraph in Art 19(1) TEU requiring Member 
States to provide access to the courts for indirect challenges at national level 
indicates that the third head of standing for challenges at EU level does not 
necessarily have to be given a wide meaning.116 Contextually, Art 263(1) refers 
to acts in general, of both legislative and non-legislative character. This 
suggests that the reference to 'regulatory acts' of Art 263(4) has a more narrow 
scope, and, therefore cannot refer to both legislative and non-legislative 
acts.117 As noted in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, so much would 
also be supported by the fact that legislative provisions should be more 
difficult to challenge than non-legislative provisions, given the democratic 
imprimatur associated with the former.118 Historically, the third head is lifted 
word for word from the Constitution for Europe. This document drew a 
categorical distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, and, 
moreover, the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference that 
negotiated the Treaty expressly sought to preserve this separation.119  
 
However, all three strands of reasoning are less convincing than they may 
initially seem. A couple of arguments may be briefly sketched. It is just as 
plausible to suggest that, for example, teleologically, the purpose of relaxing 
standing rules could be achieved through both a widening of Art 263(4) TFEU 
                                                 
the Regional Dimension of the Member States' (2010) EL Rev 609; Sthephan 
Balthasar, 'Locus Standi Rules for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private 
Applicants: the new Article 263(4) TFEU' (2010) EL Rev 542; Pieter-Augustijn Van 
Malleghem and Nils Baeten, 'Before the law stands a gatekeeper – or what is a 
'regulatory act' in Article 263(4)' (2014) Common Market Law Review 1187, René 
Barents, 'The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2010) CMLR 709; See also 
the extensive references In Advocate General Kokott's Inuit Opinion, fn 69. 
116 Inuit, fn 12, [89] – [107]. 
117 ibid, [58]. 
118 ibid, [38]. 
119 ibid, [59]. 
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and the insertion of Art 19(1) TEU. Indeed, why bother reforming Art 263(4) 
at all if Art 19(1) TEU was the solution to the standing dilemma? The 
teleological interpretation of the third head, murky as its purpose is, is 
inconclusive. It certainly does not inexorably lead to the interpretation 
adopted by the courts.120 Similarly, contextually, if the framers meant to 
exclude legislative acts from the third head they could have used the term 
'non-legislative act' which was already established in the Treaty121. It is thus 
not a foregone conclusion that there can be no overlap in the acts referred to 
in Art 263(1) and Art 263(4).122 Finally, historically the reasoning of the court is 
questionable given that the textual source of the wording was the 
Constitution for Europe, which had an entirely different context, and given 
their selective readings of the travaux préparatoires.123 
It is not a given that legislative acts cannot be regulatory. That said, one 
should be cautious in one's critique in this area. In many national 
jurisdictions, legislative acts are more difficult, or even impossible, to 
challenge.124 One cannot censure the courts for the mere fact of having 
excluded legislative measures from the third head. Nonetheless, anchoring 
the notion of 'regulatory' in whether the act was legislative or not is 
questionable in its own terms, and gives rise to some unpalatable 
consequences.  
 
First, one must question why the distinction is relevant. Why should the 
legislative basis of the act require the litigant to pursue their challenge 
indirectly, in the nearly universal situation where they cannot satisfy 
individual concern? It is tempting to point to the 'qualitative difference' 
                                                 
120 Alexander Kornezov, 'Shaping the new architecture of the EU system of judicial 
remedies; comment on Inuit' (2014) ELR 251, 261; Bast, fn 115, 907; Balthasar, fn 115, 
545-546. 
121 Lenaerts and Cambien, fn 115, 616-619; Berg, fn 115, 494; Kornezov, fn 120, 257. 
122 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, fn 69, [37]; Bast, fn 115, 990; Van Malleghem 
and Baeten, fn 115, 1205. 
123 Lenaerts and Cambien, fn 115, 617; Balthsar, fn 115, 544; Bergstrom, fn 115, 498, Van 
Malleghem and Baeten, fn 115, 1204-1213. 
124 Brian Libgober, 'Can the EU be a Constitutional System Without Universal Access 
to Judicial Review?' 2015 Michigan Journal of International Law 353; Kornezov, fn 
120, 258; Albors-Lorens, fn 16, 519. 
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between the two in terms of democratic legitimacy.125 This is not a 
satisfactory response. It proves too little because it is doubtful whether 
legislative process does indeed confer such a difference in the first place. It is 
not difficult to find legislative procedures that closely resemble those used to 
promulgate non-legislative acts.126 Moreover, the Council, whose members 
are not democratically elected, carries as much weight as the Parliament in 
the ordinary legislative procedure.127 But, more fundamentally, it also proves 
too much. If the 'qualitative difference' holds true, why is it just as easy to 
challenge a legislative provision of EU law indirectly under the Art 267 
procedure as it would be in respect of a non-legislative measure?128 Appeals to 
the democratic credentials of the act seem both questionable in their own 
terms, and illogical in relation to indirect enforcement. In any case, from a 
broader perspective, it is questionable to what extent one can transpose 
domestic constitutional justifications for the insulation of legislative acts 
from judicial challenge to the supranational EU order. Laws passed by 
national legislatures cannot necessarily be equated with the products of what 
the EU dubs a 'legislative' process in terms of form, procedure, or democratic 
legitimacy.129 
 
Second, it brings a distinctly formalistic touch to the third head, given that it 
relies on the purely formal criterion of whether a given measure was 
legislative or not.130 A given policy change could easily be enacted on a 
legislative or a non-legislative basis. One might take an example from the area 
of Common Fisheries Policy, namely rules that govern the mesh sizes of 
fishing nets. In Jégo-Quéré, the size restriction was implemented on the basis 
of a Council Regulation that authorised the Commission to take emergency 
measures to safeguard the population of hake.131 This act was clearly not a 
legislative act, and, as such, it could now be challenged under the third head 
                                                 
125 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, fn 69, [38]. 
126 Alan Dashwood and others, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union Law (6th Ed, OUP, 
2011), 85. 
127 Albors-Lorens, fn 223, 524; Bast, fn 115, 897. 
128 Dougan, fn 115, 678-9. 
129 Dougan fn 115; Koch, fn 17, 526; Bast, fn 115, 897 'Not all legislative acts benefit from 
a high level of parliamentary involvement in the making of the act'.  
130 Barents, fn 115, 725; Albors-Lorens, fn 223, 524; Bast, fn 115, 925. 
131 Case C-262/03 P ECLI:EU:C:2004:210 Commission v Jégo-Quéré. 
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as long the claimants could show that the measure did not entail 
implementing measures.132 However, it would have been possible to 
implement similar restrictions on a legislative basis. Art 37(2) EC required 
acts in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy, which includes the 
Common Fisheries Policy133, to be adopted on a legislative basis. Read 
together with the relevant provision in the Basic Regulation No 2371/2002, 
so-called 'measures regarding the structure of fishing gear' would have to be 
enacted on a legislative basis.134 For example, Council Regulation No 
1342/2008,135 in Annex One, imposed a range of restrictions on the mesh sizes 
of fishing nets used to catch cod. This was a legislative act136 and, as such, 
could not have been challenged under the third head. Given the difficulty of 
any undertaking showing that they were individually concerned by the 
measure, it is likely that any direct challenge would have been rejected as 
inadmissible. Whether an act is legislative or non-legislative has an element 
of fortuity; it does not necessarily have any bearing on the substance of what 
is challenged. This perpetuates the element of lottery in EU standing 
provisions, with the ability to bring direct challenges contingent on this 
seemingly arbitrary criterion. 
 
                                                 
132 See, Advocate General Kokott, fn 69, [59]. 
133 See Art 32 EC. 
134 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable 
exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 358, 
31.12.2002, p. 59–80, Art 4(2)(g)(i). 
135 Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-
term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 423/2004, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 20–33. 
136 Joined Cases C-124/13 and C-125/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:790, Parliament and Commission 
v Council, [21] 'The Commission considers that Regulation [No] 1342/2008 ... which 
was adopted as a legislative act …' (emphasis added). Note this comparison has been 
deliberately confined to two pre-Lisbon measures as the inter-institutional 
responsibility for the Common Fisheries Policy was subject to considerable change 
in the Lisbon Treaty, with a preference for normative changes having to be adopted 
under legislative process as contemplated in Art 43(2) and not Art 42(3). For context, 
see Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Cases C-124/13 and C-125/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:337, Parliament and Commission v Council. 
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Third, the requirement that a regulatory act be non-legislative means that 
legislative acts are still as difficult to challenge. Two post-Lisbon cases, Beul137 
and ABZ138, are good examples of this. For context, Beul concerned a measure 
designed to guarantee the independence of auditors with the effect that the 
claimant could no longer supervise the auditing of public-interest 
undertakings, and ABZ dealt with the sharing of genetic information by plant 
breeders.  
 
Both of the contested provisions were legislative acts. As a result, the 
claimants could not rely on the third head. 139 As to the second head, the court 
noted that the contested acts produced legal effects in the abstract with 
respect to a general class of persons.140 As is known, it is nearly impossible to 
show individual concern in relation to such an act. The notable exception to 
this would be Codorníu, where a regulation limiting the terms 'crémant' to 
sparkling wines of French and Luxemburgish origins was of individual 
concern to a Spanish producer who enjoyed a trademark in respect of their 
'Gran Cremant'.141 However, this judgment was readily distinguished. In Beul, 
the court recalled that the trademark in Codorníu was an individualised 
entitlement and thus of a different nature to a general right to carry out a 
profession142, and in ABZ the applicant failed to show prejudice that other 
plant breeders in a similar situation would not also suffer143. 
  
Both Beul and ABZ are on appeal, and it may well be that the CJEU takes a 
more benign view.144 However, even if they are successful, it is clear standing 
still turns on technical distinctions in the application of individual concern. 
                                                 
137 Case T-640/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:907, Carsten Beul v Parliament and Council. 
138 Case T-560/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:314, ABZ Aardbeien Uit Zaad v Parliament and 
Council. Note that Case T-559/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:315 Ackermann Saatzucht GmbH 
& Co. KG deals with an almost identical challenge, and reaches the same conclusion.  
139 Beul, fn 137, [18] – [20]; ABZ, fn 138, [24] – [26]. 
140 Beul, fn 137, [32] – [37]; ABZ, fn 138, [33]. 
141 Codorníu, fn 14. 
142 Beul, fn 137, [48]. 
143 ABZ, fn 138, [39]. 
144 Case C-53/16 P, Carsten Beul v Parliament and Council (not yet reported as of 
28/06/2016); Case C-409/15 P, ABZ Aardbeien Uit Zaad and Others v Parliament and 
Council (not yet reported as of 28/06/2016). 
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Even if one accepts that legislative EU measures should be more difficult to 
challenge, it is difficult to justify the tombola of making standing contingent 
on whether it is possible to shoehorn one's case into a Codorníu-type 
situation.  
 
IV. WHY DO THE COURTS INTERPRET STANDING RULES RESTRICTIVELY? 
 
As has been stressed throughout Part III, it is entirely possible to conceive of 
a broader scope for the third head. Interpretations that are both textually 
faithful and teleologically coherent can readily be provided. The CJEU could 
easily endorse such interpretations. Yet it does not. In spite of a madrigal of 
dissent – from academia145, Advocates General146, and even within the 
courts147 – it remains unflinching in its restrictive approach. 
To fully appreciate why this is so, it is necessary to turn to the doctrinal 
justifications of the restrictive approach. It shall be seen that this doctrine 
rests on a fundamental assumption, supported by three buttressing 
justifications. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the pre-Lisbon doctrine has 
been carried over in its entirety to the post-Lisbon interpretation of the 
standing rules. The jurisprudence is thus tainted by its restrictive pre-Lisbon 
approach, and, as a result, the courts' approach to standing has not changed, 
to any perceptible level, after the Lisbon reforms. 
  
1. The Pre-Lisbon Explanations 
The fundamental assumption in the courts' restrictive approach lay in the 
architecture of the Treaties. At its heart was the interplay between the 
standing rules for direct challenge in Art 230(4) EC, on the one hand, and the 
possibility for a national court to refer a dispute to the CJEU under Art 234 
                                                 
145 See fn 2 and fn 115. 
146 Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197 Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v Council, and in Case C-358/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:144 Extramet v Council; 
Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:476, British 
American Tobacco; Advocate General Wathelet in Woonpunt fn 67; Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón in T and L, fn 32. 
147 Fuller explanation is given in this text at fn 153 and 154. See Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré 
v Commission, Case C-262/03 P ECLI:EU:C:2004:210 Commission v Jégo-Quéré, 
Christopher Brown and John Morijn, 'Case C-262/03 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré' 
(2004) Common Market Law Review 1639 
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EC, on the other. This allowed the EU courts to argue that the inability to 
bring direct actions before the EU courts was adequately compensated by the 
possibility of indirect challenge. On this view, the fact that a party did not 
have standing for direct challenge was not really a 'gap' in effective judicial 
protection. That party was free to challenge national measures taken in 
pursuance of the contested EU norm, and, in so doing, provoke a reference 
to the CJEU. Indeed, such indirect enforcement was found to represent the 
'very essence' of judicial protection.148  
 
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores is an excellent pre-Lisbon example.149 The 
litigants argued that the inability to challenge measures reorganising the olive 
oil market amounted to a violation of their right to effective judicial 
protection. The CJEU, recalling the admissibility criteria in Art 230(4) EC 
and the preliminary reference procedure under Art 234 EC, noted that where 
a complainant could not bring himself within the admissibility criteria of the 
former article, they were able to indirectly plead the invalidity of the 
contested norm before the national courts based on the latter article. Thus, 
concluded the CJEU, the Treaty provided a 'complete system of legal 
remedies'.150 This time-honoured phrase was repeated, again and again, in the 
jurisprudence.151 
 
This assumption, however, was not perfect. It assumed – and herein laid its 
Achilles' heel – that there were indeed domestic measures that could be 
contested in national courts. This was not the case in respect of 'self-
executing measures', measures which in and of themselves gave rise to the 
legal effects complained of. As we have seen in our discussion of Microban in 
part II, such measures could only be challenged by contravening the EU norm 
in question, and then challenging the sanctions, first in national courts, and 
after in the CJEU if they were referred under the preliminary reference 
                                                 
148 Case C-301/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2001:72, Area Cova SA, [46]. 
149 Case C-50/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197, Unión de Pequeños Agricoltres v Council. 
150 ibid, [40]. 
151 Les Verts, fn 90, [23]; Unión de Pequeños Agricoltres, fn 148, [40]; Jégo-Quéré, fn 131, [30]; 
Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-241/04, ECLI:EU:T:2005:426, European Environmental 
Bureau, [66]; Case T-108/03, ECLIEU:T:2005:68, Von Pezold, [51] – [52]; Case T-
167/02, ECLI:EU:2003:81, Établissements Toulorge, [65] 
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procedure. The dilemma arose in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores where the 
claimants noted that 'neither the Spanish State nor the autonomous 
communities of which it is composed have adopted measures to implement 
the contested regulation'.152 
  
The dilemma also arose in Jégo-Quéré, where the restriction on the fishnet 
mesh sizes required no implementing measures.153 The natural response, one 
might think, would have been to expand the interpretation of the 
admissibility criteria in Art 230(4) in order to reduce the incidence of the 
dilemma. The Court of First Instance ('CFI', now the General Court) did 
exactly that. It 'reconsidered' the strict interpretation of individual concern, 
and found it satisfied where 'the measure in question affects his legal position, 
in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or 
by imposing obligations on him'.154 
 
The CJEU was of a different view, and quashed the CFI's interpretation on 
appeal.155 The logical approach of the CFI was stoutly resisted by the CJEU, 
on three grounds. These served as distinct buttressing arguments that, at 
least in the eyes of the courts, validated the restrictive approach to standing. 
 
First, the courts denied that the dilemma existed. It was explained that the 
litigants in Jégo-Quéré could have contacted the relevant national authorities 
and sought a measure which could have itself been contested before the 
national courts, so that the individual could challenge the measure indirectly. 
Although the court simply referred to a 'measure', it seems that they were 
referring to some sort declaration from the national authorities that the 
contested regulation applied to the claimants, which, in turn, could be 
contested in the national courts.156 
 
                                                 
152 T-173/98 ECLI:EU:T:1999:296, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, [25]. 
153 Compare with Bloufin, where a similar measure did not entail implementing 
measures, fn 38. 
154 Jégo-Quéré, fn 146. 
155 Jégo Quéré, fn 146. 
156 Jégo-Quéré fn 146, [35]; Compare with Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Inuit 
at [120]. 
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Second, the courts disclaimed that they had the power to solve the dilemma. There 
were two aspects to this. The first can be considered institutional in nature, 
the second jurisdictional. First, the courts maintained that they could not 
allow direct challenges where it was impossible for a claimant to mount an 
indirect challenge. This would require the courts to assess, in each case, 
whether the litigant in question would otherwise have had no choice but to 
contravene the contested provision. The courts, it was argued, were not 
competent to carry out such an assessment of the national procedural law of 
individual Member States.157 Second, although the courts did recognise that 
having to flout the law in order to contest it fell foul of the principle of 
effective judicial protection,158 fashioning a remedy in these situations would 
have ignored the admissibility criteria in Art 230(4) EC. This provision 
required a claimant to be directly and individually concerned; it did not 
contain a residual head of standing where effective judicial protection would 
be denied due to the impossibility of indirect challenge. Any contrary 
interpretation would have forced the courts out of the bounds of their 
jurisdiction.159 
 
Finally, the courts deflected the responsibility for solving the dilemma. It argued 
that the solution to the dilemma was not to facilitate access to the EU courts 
by expanding the heads of standing. Rather, it was to ensure that national 
courts interpreted and applied domestic procedural rules so as to allow the 
litigant to challenge the norm at the national level, and that Member States, 
in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation under Art 10 EC, 
adopted measures guaranteed such access.160 Responsibility, therefore, lay at 
the national level and not the EU level. Alternatively, it was up to the Member 
States to amend Art 230(4) EC in subsequent Treaties.161 
                                                 
157 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, fn 148, [43]; Commission v Jégo-Quéré, fn 146, [34]. 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, fn 148, [102(3)]. 
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The courts' response to the dilemma is wide-ranging, to put it mildly. They 
simultaneously maintain that the dilemma is not really a problem (buttressing 
argument 1), and that the courts cannot solve it in any case (buttressing 
argument 2); the courts recognise both that they cannot remedy the dilemma 
(buttressing argument 2), and that it is not the courts' problem to solve 
anyway (buttressing argument 3). The dilemma is attacked on all fronts, 
which, to some extent, confirms its status as a thorn in the completeness of 
the Treaties touted by the courts. 
 
2. The Post-Lisbon Explanations 
The courts have seized on the Lisbon reforms to strengthen this restrictive 
interpretation. 
 
First, the pre-Lisbon fundamental assumption prevails. The courts have stoutly 
defended the notion that indirect challenges are adequate substitutes for 
direct challenges Reiterating its time-honoured approach, the courts note, 
again and again, that Art 263(4) and Art 267 provide a 'complete system of 
legal remedies'.162 In the absence of implementing measures, contested 
norms could be challenged directly under the third head. If not, the litigants 
were free to bring proceedings in national courts, and, if well founded, have 
them referred to the CJEU.163 To gainsay this, in the eyes of the court, 
amounts to a claim for an 'unconditional entitlement' – a hyperbole which is 
flatly rejected.164 
 
Thus, when Telefónica could not challenge the Commission's finding that the 
tax scheme they benefitted from was unlawful, the CJEU reminded them that 
they were free to challenge the implementing measures (in the form of tax 
notices issued by the relevant national authorities) in national courts.165 The 
Treaties created a Union based on the rule of law, boasting a complete system 
                                                 
162 T and L, fn 11, [45]; Inuit, fn 12, [92]; Telefónica, fn 12, [57]; European Union Copper Task 
Force, fn 46, [54]; Beul, fn 136, [54]; Case T-541/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, ADEDY, 
[89]. 
163 Inuit, fn 11, [93] and [96]. 
164 ibid [105]. 
165 ibid [58], [59]. 
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of legal remedies.166 This is almost word-for-word lifted from the pre-Lisbon 
approach. The fundamentally restrictive approach of the courts has clearly 
not shifted. 
 
Second, the three buttressing arguments against more liberal interpretations of the 
standing rules have been strengthened. The courts have cleverly found further 
validation in the Lisbon Treaty for the three buttressing arguments in favour 
of their restrictive approach. The courts now deny the dilemma, disclaim the 
power to solve it and deflect responsibility for its solution with almost greater 
force than they did prior to the Lisbon reforms. 
 
The denial of the dilemma is facilitated by the insertion of the third head. The 
courts consider that the dilemma has been laid to rest by the possibility of 
parties challenging provisions that do not entail implementing measures. The 
gaps in the standing rules have been plugged, and indirect challenges are 
paraded as conferring universally effective judicial protection. The dilemma 
has breathed its last; long live indirect challenges. In the soothing words of 
Advocate General Kokott, there is 'no reason to fear a gap in the legal 
remedies available to individuals' due to the possibility of indirect challenge 
which has now been buttressed by the possibility of challenging provisions 
that do not entail implementing measures.167 As shall be seen, this is wrong, 
yet it forms an important part of the post-Lisbon justifications for the 
restrictive position. 
 
This is a considerably stronger argument than the pre-Lisbon attempt to 
dispose of the dilemma. The contention raised in Jégo-Quéré to the effect that 
a party could 'seek a measure' from the national authorities was a weak one.168 
Its formulation in broad and general terms gave little guidance as to how it 
                                                 
166 ibid [56], [57]. 
167 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Inuit, fn 69, [115]. However, for the 
avoidance of doubt, this passage is descriptive; I am not of the opinion that the 
dilemma has indeed been laid to rest. See Part V) 3) a).  
168 See discussion at fn 156. 
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might apply in practice.169 It assumed that it was possible to obtain such a 
measure from the national authorities – whatever that might mean – and also 
assumed that such measures could indeed be contested in the domestic 
courts, regardless of the relevant national rules in a given Member State. The 
woolliness of this argument was readily apparent, and frequently contested.170 
Now, however, it is no longer necessary to resort to these somewhat 
desperate arguments. It is possible to point to the Treaty text, which now 
grants the standing to challenge measures that do not entail implementing 
measures, as the definitive solution to the dilemma. 
 
As such, the courts do not need to disclaim their ability to solve the dilemma. The 
courts nonetheless do so. The CJEU has repeated that Art 263(4) does not 
grant a party standing to mount a direct challenge when that party cannot 
challenge the contested provision indirectly. To hold otherwise would flout 
the text of Art 263(4).171 In a similar vein, it also maintains that it could not 
carry out an assessment of national procedural law to verify whether a party 
is genuinely caught on the horns of dilemma.172 These arguments, as has been 
seen, were part and parcel of the pre-Lisbon jurisprudence. Likewise, the 
claims that this restrictive approach should be reconsidered in light of the 
principle of effective judicial protection are rejected. The courts' standard 
response is to assert, on occasion by reference to the Explanation to Art 47 of 
the Charter, that Art 47 cannot require derogation from the Treaty text. The 
courts cannot set aside the admissibility criteria in the text of Art 263(4).173 
                                                 
169 Note that Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion for Inuit invoked this argument, 
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This further substantiates the courts' assertions that they are powerless to 
expand the scope of standing for direct challenges. 
 
In terms of deflecting responsibility, the courts have found further validation of 
the responsibility of Member States for ensuring the effectiveness of indirect 
challenges in Art 19(1) TEU. The Lisbon Reforms added a second paragraph 
to this provision, such that the Article now reads as follows: 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of 
Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. 
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law. 
 
The second half has been seized on as clear textual authority that the 
responsibility for ensuring that parties can challenge EU law lies at the 
national level. The intention of the framers was not, therefore, to expand the 
possibility of direct challenge at the EU level, save in respect of the dilemma 
which was solved through the addition of the third head.174 Effective judicial 
protection is preserved as long as Member States discharge their obligations 
under Art 19(1) of the TEU. This guarantees the availability of indirect 
enforcement and the erstwhile dilemma, in the courts' reasoning, simply 
withers away. Thus, the responsibility for the dilemma is deflected from the 
supra-national sphere to the domestic sphere. 
 
Finally, the courts deny that the third head was designed to secure an overall 
relaxation of the standing rules. This is a crucial point. As far as the courts are 
concerned, the objective of the third head was simply to solve the dilemma. 
As long as it achieves that effect, there is no need to expand the standing rules 
further. 
 
                                                 
174 The point emerges clearly from Advocate General Kokott Opinion in Inuit, fn 69, 
[35] 'It can be inferred from the co-existence of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU that the legal remedies 
available to individuals against European Union acts of general application do not 
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FESI, a challenge to anti-dumping duties which failed based on reasoning 
examined above in Part III, illustrates this particularly well. The General 
Court noted that the 'objective pursued' by Art 263(4) TFEU was to 'avoid a 
situation where [a claimant] would have to break the law in order to have 
justice'.175 No mention is made of other justifications for liberalising the 
standing rules – justifications which the court would have been aware of.176 
The third head was intended to remedy the dilemma and, certainly, no more. 
Thus the fact that it was possible for FESI to challenge the implementing 
measures in national courts, as guaranteed by the Customs Code, meant that 
there was no need to extend the interpretation of Art 263(4) any further.177 
Other examples can readily be found.178 
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However, (…) in the present case, the applicant may (…) challenge the national 
implementing measures of the contested regulation' (See also Eurofer, fn 76, [60]) 
Telefónica, fn 12, [27] – [28] '[the objective of Art 263(4)] consists in preventing an 
individual from being obliged to infringe the law in order to have access to a court. 
(…) Natural or legal persons who are unable (…) to challenge a regulatory act of the 
European Union directly before the European Union judicature are protected 
against the application to them of such an act by the ability to challenge the 
implementing measures which the act entails.' 
Federcoopesca, fn 37, [28] – [29] '(…) the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 
263 TFEU is designed to apply only when the disputed act, in itself, in other words 
irrespective of any implementing measures, alters the legal situation of the applicant 
(…) when an act does not, in itself, alter the applicant's legal situation, that situation 
is only altered if measures to implement the act are taken in respect of the applicant. 
The applicant can then challenge those measures and, in the context of that 
challenge, plead that the act implemented by them is unlawful, so that he cannot be 
regarded as having been denied effective judicial protection.' 
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The dilemma thus plays a crucial role in the courts' reasoning. It is presented 
as the sole reason for reforming the standing rules, rather than an opportunity 
to move towards a more liberal EU standing regime. This technique of 
limiting the scope of the third head to solving the dilemma, and then finding 
that the purpose of the third head has been upheld given the possibility of 
indirect challenge is a central theme in the post-Lisbon jurisprudence. It is 
also a highly effective two-pronged assault on the possibility of more liberal 
standing provisions. It attacks the need for a more expansive interpretation of 
standing rules by limiting the scope of the purpose behind the third head. It 
also belittles the desirability of such an interpretation by stressing that it is 
possible for the litigant to mount an indirect challenge. This, in turn, 
validates the courts' long-standing assertion that such indirect challenges are, 
from the perspective of effective judicial protection, adequate substitutes for 
direct challenges. 
 
The dilemma – argument in favour of more liberal standing rules – has been 
cleverly turned on its head. The solution of the dilemma is a ceiling on the 
interpretation of the standing criteria, and not a floor. Despite the myriad of 
arguments against the restrictive position of the courts, if there is no dilemma 
there is no need for expansion. Of course, even if the dilemma did arise, the 
courts would be powerless to assist, and, naturally, would assert that it is not 
their responsibility to solve it. The courts attack the dilemma on all fronts. 
The restrictive interpretation has not shifted – the dilemma 
notwithstanding. 
 
V. AN ASSESSMENT: ARE THE RESTRICTIVE RULES JUSTIFIED? 
 
For balance and context, it is worth separating this final substantive Part in 
three sections. The first gives a bird's eye view of what legitimate purposes 
the admissibility criteria for direct actions could serve. This is an important 
discussion which is to some extent muted in the existing literature. The 
second dismisses the courts' restrictive position by refuting the fundamental 
assumption and points out the flaws in the buttressing justifications. The 
final fleshes out some of the benefits that more relaxed standing rules could 
bring. 
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1. A Bird's Eye View of the Justifications of the Admissibility Criteria for Direct 
Actions 
One might get the impression that any limit on direct challenges – regardless 
of merit or the extent to which the claimant is affected by the contested 
measure – is to be censured as an affront to the principle of effective judicial 
review. That is not my contention. Critiques of the narrow standing rules, 
like the present one, cannot be blind to the existence of indirect enforcement 
provided for in the Treaty. Indirect challenges have been used to challenge, 
and, ultimately, invalidate unlawful EU norms.179 The interplay between Art 
263(4) and Art 267 is a crucial part of the legal architecture of the Union. The 
underlying purpose of setting certain thresholds to overcome in order to 
challenge a provision of EU law direct can, if balanced properly, serve 
legitimate and wholly commendable ends – both from the perspective of the 
CJEU and from the perspective of litigants. 
 
From the perspective of the CJEU, standing may act as a useful triage 
mechanism. If a party is not sufficiently affected by a contested norm they 
will not be able to challenge it directly. They will, first, have to mount a 
challenge in domestic courts, and this dispute will only be referred to the 
CJEU under Art 267 if it sufficiently meritorious. The wheat is referred to the 
CJEU and the chaff remains on the threshing floors of national courts. Thus, 
Art 267 and Art 263(4), working together, can provide a guarantee that 
judicial time is not wasted on fruitless or otherwise meritless challenges. The 
practical benefits of this are evident, but it must not be forgotten that 
benefits also connect, more fundamentally, to the proper administration of 
justice.180 From the perspective of litigants who are not sufficiently affected by a 
measure to mount a direct challenge, indirect enforcement nonetheless 
                                                 
179 See, for example, Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner; Joined Cases C-293/12 and C‑594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, Digital 
Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications; Case C-333/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:764, 
Société Régie Networks v Direction de contrôle fiscal Rhône-Alpes Bourgogne. 
180 Efficiency and proportionality have clear roles in the proper administration of 
justice. One might take the example of England and Wales. The Civil Procedure 
Rules, Statutory Instrument No. 3132 of 1998, state that dealing with a case justly 
includes, so far as is practicable, dealing with the case in ways which are 
proportionate to the importance of the case and to the complexity of the issues (Part 
1.1(2)(c)(ii) and (iii)). 
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allows them to challenge the contested norm. Such parties, not meeting the 
criteria for direct challenge, are offered a second bite at the cherry in the form 
of indirect enforcement. The price they pay for this bite, justified by the need 
to ensure the merit of their challenge, is the need to bring proceedings in 
domestic courts. 
 
Thus, indirect enforcement can ensure that a balance is preserved between, 
on the one hand, an individual's right of access to justice and, on the other, 
the proper administration of justice. On the one hand, litigants are not locked 
out simply because they are not sufficiently affected by a provision of EU law; 
they are granted a second opportunity in the form of indirect challenge. On 
the other, the court has the benefit of a guarantee that the issues for their 
consideration are, indeed, worth their consideration. Its time is not 
dissipated on unworthy disputes. 
 
That said, this is a delicate system. The admissibility criteria must be 
calibrated to ensure a fair balance between these two desiderata. Too 
expansive, and the filtering mechanism in Art 267 may not function properly 
as a filter, as too many litigants will avoid the reference procedure and instead 
bring their claims directly. This could well result in an inundation of cases 
without the guarantees that they are worth the courts' time. This would be to 
the peril of the proper administration of justice. Too narrow, however, and 
national proceedings may become unprincipled burdens imposed on almost 
all of litigants – the argument that they are fair prices given that the litigants 
are not sufficiently affected by the contested norm no longer holds true. Too 
many claimants are forced to engage in lengthy and otherwise unjustified 
national proceedings, and their right to effective judicial protection is left 
without practical meaning. 
 
Most importantly, it must be shown that the present position maintains this 
equilibrium. It cannot be assumed that it does. The courts' present approach, 
however, seems to point, again and again, to notions like the completeness of 
the system of legal remedies without actually showing how or why it is indeed 
complete. Most of the conclusions reached by the courts in relation to the 
right to effective judicial protection are simply expressed by reference to a 
common mantra, rather than properly reasoned and explained. However, the 
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completeness of the Treaties must be proved, not supposed; that parties are 
provided with effective judicial protection is to be substantiated and not 
simply stated; and the fundamental assumptions and the buttressing 
justifications are to be reasoned through and not simply reiterated. 
 
On closer inspection, it is, in fact, clear that the admissibility criteria are far 
too restrictive to even come close to the balanced system fleshed out above. 
The criteria are overwhelmingly skewed in favour indirect enforcement. 
They reflect a blasé assumption that indirect enforcement, entangling the 
vast majority of claimants in wild goose chases before national courts, is an 
adequate substitute for direct actions. When this assumption – the fabric of 
the restrictive rules – is examined closer it is clear that it is untenable both in 
practice and in principle. Indirect challenges pose clear practical 
disadvantages in relation to direct challenges, and this would be readily 
perceived if the EU courts applied the same rigour in applying the principle 
of effectiveness it would expect of national courts. The three arguments that 
are woven into this are equally thin, and fray on closer inspection. They evade 
rather than justify the restrictiveness of the admissibility criteria. They are 
loose ends which, when tugged on, reveal a warped system of legal remedies, 
not a complete one. The acceptability of the present position, as well as the 
desirability of narrow standing rules in general, then quickly unravels. 
 
2. Is the Present Position Justified?  
For clarity, it is worth dividing this section to first assess the courts' 
fundamental assumption, and then proceed to comment on the three 
buttressing justifications. 
 
A. The Fundamental Assumption 
Indirect enforcement is not an adequate substitute for direct enforcement, 
either on a practical level or in terms of the principle of effective judicial 
protection. 
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a. Practical Equivalence? 
First, there is no guarantee that a national court will refer a challenge to 
domestic provisions to the CJEU.181 Although the EU courts maintain that a 
reference is required whenever the challenge is well founded,182 this still 
involves an element of speculation as far as the individual litigant is 
concerned. Moreover, it is not clear that a party would have any 
straightforward or acceptable legal recourse should the national authorities 
fail to make a reference under Art 267.183  
 
Second, even if the national court does indeed refer the matter to the CJEU, 
it is neither guaranteed that all the challenges by the litigant will be referred, 
nor that they will be referred as the claimant framed those challenges.184 In 
any case, the CJEU is free to reformulate the questions as it sees fit, and it not 
bound to answer the questions by reference to the tenor of national 
proceedings.185 The overall effect is that the party cannot meaningfully be said 
to be challenging the provision in question; it surrenders its case to national 
courts and the vagaries of the Art 267 procedure. 
 
Third, there are considerable drawbacks in both the domestic proceedings 
and the need to refer the case to the CJEU. Concerning the first, the party 
cannot achieve the desired result in national proceedings, given that national 
courts do not have the power to strike down the offending provision of EU 
                                                 
181 Morten Broberg and Niels Feuger, Preliminary References to the European Court of 
Justice (OUP, 2010), Chapter 6. 
182 See, for example, Inuit fn 12, [96], citing Case C-344/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, IATA 
and ELFAA, [27] - [30]; T and L, fn 12, [48]; European Union Copper Task Force, fn 46, 
[57]. 
183 Roberto Mastroianni and Andrea Pezza, 'Striking the Right Balance: Limits on the 
Rights to Bring an Action under Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union' (2015) American University International Law Review 743; 
Broberg and Feuger, fn 181, 265 – 272 (noting that state liability for failure to refer 
would only realistically be triggered when it could be shown the court acted in bad 
faith). 
184 Broberg and Feuger, fn 181, 295 ('a national court that contemplates making a 
preliminary reference is not required to consult the parties to the proceedings on the 
questions that it considers referring'). 
185 Van Malleghem and Baeten, fn 115, 1215. 
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law.186 Moreover, the party in question is limited to remedies only in respect 
of the Member State where they bring proceedings, which may offer 
insufficient protection in the many cases that involve an EU-wide geographic 
scope.187 Concerning the need to refer the case to the CJEU, there are clear 
procedural disadvantages in referring the matter to the CJEU, and the party 
has to suffer the length – on average 15 months – and cost associated with such 
a referral.188 
 
Finally, at the level of principle, the reference procedure under Art 267 is 
radically different from annulment actions before EU courts. The latter offer 
a forum to hear an individual litigant's claims that a contested norm is 
unlawful and provides a remedy to address that complaint if it proves to be 
well founded. The former is, however, a mechanism designed to ensure the 
uniform application and interpretation of EU law. It is not possible to simply 
replace a remedial scheme with a co-operative mechanism whose purpose is 
to ensure the consistent interpretation of EU law.189 
 
b. Effective Judicial Protection? 
It is difficult to square the EU courts' attitude to effective judicial protection 
in their own courts in relation to indirect challenges, on the one hand, with 
its application of the principle in national courts, on the other. The CJEU has 
masterfully relied on effective judicial protection as a keystone of the EU 
legal order to ensure the uniform enforcement of EU law. Many domestic 
                                                 
186 Case C-314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost; Van 
Malleghem and Baeten, ibid, 1214; Cornelia Koch, 'Locus Standi of private applicants 
under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the protection of individuals' right to 
an effective remedy' 2005 ELR 511, 515. 
187 Mastroianni and Pezza, fn 183. 
188 See CJEU Press Release, 'Statistics concerning judicial activity in 2014' 
(http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-03/cp150027en.pdf, 
retrieved 12th April 2016); Van Malleghem and Baeten, fn 115, 1215; Mastroianni and 
Pezza, fn 183. 
189 Biernat, fn 14, 27-28; Craig, fn 15, 502; Broberg and Feuger, fn 181, 279 ('The 
preliminary reference procedure does not as such constitute a dispute resolution 
procedure; rather it is a non-contentious stage in the procedure before the national 
court. Article [267] does not provide a judicial remedy for the parties to the main 
proceedings.'). 
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norms have met their end on the EU guillotine of effectiveness, whether they 
be constitutional understandings on the provision of legal aid190, or 
customary limits on the granting of injunctions.191 But its blade seems far less 
sharp, and its executioners far more squeamish, when it comes to examining 
the effectiveness of indirect challenges. 
 
When claimants argue that the restrictive standing provisions are 
inconsistent with the principle of judicial protection, the claims are tersely 
dismissed. In Telefónica, for example the court dedicates only three 
substantive paragraphs to the claim that their right to judicial protection was 
violated. The first notes that the Union is founded on the rule of law, the 
second states that the Treaties provide a complete system of remedies and 
the third points disappointed litigants in the direction of the Art 267 
preliminary reference procedure.192 The analysis goes no further. The mere 
fact that indirect challenges exist seems to be in and of itself sufficient to 
satisfy the principle of effectiveness. 
 
Compare this totemic consideration of effectiveness with the searching 
inquiry the CJEU would expect of national courts when they examine 
whether domestic remedies satisfy the requirement of effectiveness. Levez 
provides an excellent contrast.193 At issue, amongst other things, was the 
application of a two-year limitation period for sex discrimination claims. The 
claimant, duped by her employer as to the salary of her male counterparts, fell 
outside this limitation period. Her right of action in the employment tribunal 
was thus time-barred, and she was left with the possibility of pursuing an 
action in fraud at common law in the County Court. The national court 
referred the issue to the CJEU, asking whether this satisfied the principle of 
effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
190 Case C-279/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels v Bundes- 
republik Deutschland. 
191 Case C-213/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:25, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, 
ex parte: Factortame Ltd and Others. 
192 Telefónica, fn 12, [56], [57], [59]. 
193 Case C-326/96, ECLI:EU:C1998:577, Levez v Jennings. 
2016} The EU Courts Stand Their Ground 162 
The CJEU directed the national courts were required to consider whether 
the enforcement of her rights in the County Court would incur 'additional 
costs and delay' in comparison with the simpler procedure before the 
employment tribunal, and take account of 'special features of the procedure 
before national courts'.194 Clearly, the mere fact that an alternative procedure 
in the County Court existed was not sufficient to satisfy the principle of 
judicial protection. 
 
The CJEU's restrictive approach to standing rules would clearly not survive 
the scrutiny it required of the domestic courts in Levez. According to the 
CJEU's own standards, simply pointing to the existence of indirect actions is 
insufficient. It would have to consider the additional costs and delay of such 
actions. It would have to note their special features, like the inability to quash 
the contested norm in national courts, or the fact that those national courts 
could not grant EU-wide interim measures. Trotting out, time and time 
again, blithe references to the abstract completeness of the Treaties and the 
rule of law would fall far short of the searching inquiry the CJEU would 
expect of national courts. Against this background, it is very difficult to 
accept the courts' conclusion that the principle of effective judicial 
protection is satisfied by its restrictive interpretation of the standing rules. 
 
B. Denying the Scope of the Dilemma 
As has been seen, the courts have limited the purposes of the third head to 
plugging the dilemma, and has maintained that further extensions beyond 
this are not required in light of the obligations on domestic bodies. However, 
that the dilemma has not been laid to rest by the courts' interpretation of the 
third head. It continues to haunt the jurisprudence.  
 
First, the dilemma still exists in respect of legislative acts, which cannot be 
challenged under the third head. This is of concern. For example, a measure 
restricting fish net mesh sizes could be of a legislative nature. It is also 
unlikely to require implementing measures.195 In such a case, a litigant would 
have to breach the restriction to challenge it. 
 
                                                 
194 ibid, [51] and [44]. 
195 See, for example, Jégo-Quéré, fn 131.  
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Second, the dilemma still prevails where 'implementing measures' are, in the 
eyes of national jurisdictions, mere formalities that cannot be challenged in 
domestic courts. T and L is a good illustration. Unlike the field of customs 
duties where the EU Customs Code provides statutory routes of appeal, 
there was no EU-wide remedial scheme that would have granted redress in T 
and L. Moreover, it did not seem that the Portuguese legal system would have 
allowed them to challenge the granting of certificates unless the individual 
certificate was ultra vires the national authority's power. This was not the 
case.196 As was accepted by the General Court, and the Commission, the 
claimants could not challenge any of the implementing measures before the 
national courts.197 However, their claim was dismissed as inadmissible – the 
lack of effective judicial protection notwithstanding.  
 
The courts would have to accept that this falls short of the principle of 
effective judicial protection.198 Yet, of course, the courts would be quick to 
respond that Art 263(4) could not accommodate a residual head of standing 
in Art 263(4) for those litigants who could not challenge a norm in domestic 
courts. But this does not change the fact that the courts' interpretation of the 
third head – designed, according to its own jurisprudence, to plug the 
dilemma – neither plugs that dilemma nor guarantees effective judicial 
protection when that dilemma arises. The standing rules thus fall short not 
only of promises of effective judicial protection, but also assertions that the 
pre-Lisbon gap in the standing rules has been plugged by the third head. 
 
The dilemma is alive and kicking. It still rears its ugly head. And the CJEU's 
unwillingness to broaden the standing rules in response is of considerable 
concern. 
 
C. Disclaiming the Power to Solve the Dilemma 
The courts' disclaimer is disingenuous. As to the institutional argument, 
there is, doubtlessly, force to the contention that the courts cannot conduct 
                                                 
196 See also Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, fn 32 [13]. 
197 Case T-279/11, ECLI:EU:T:2013:299, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, 
[63] and [65]. 
198 See, Unibet fn 157; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Inuit fn 67, [119]. 
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a systematic review of whether a party is caught on the horns of dilemma.199 
But this is not the only way to relax the rigour of the standing rules. As has 
been shown throughout the article, it would be entirely possible to mitigate 
the incidence of the dilemma by, for example, finding that regulatory acts 
could encompass acts of a legislative nature or adopting a more substantive 
analysis of what constitutes an implementing measure. This would save both 
litigants who would have fallen prey to the dilemma mentioned in the section 
above. Namely, Jégo-Quére could challenge the legislative measure as a 
regulatory act within the meaning of Art 263(4), and T and L could have 
argued that the contested scheme was sufficiently operational such that it did 
not entail implementing measures. All this could readily be accomplished 
without transgressing the bounds of the CJEU's institutional capacity. 
 
The ultra vires argument is equally unconvincing. At a general level, this 
fastidious concern for textual legalism is out of character for the CJEU. The 
courts' landmark cases are a series of teleological interpretations designed to 
secure the effective and uniform application of EU law.200 Yet one does not 
need to revisit Costa201 and Francovich202 and the other cases in the CJEU's 
Hall of Fame to highlight this inconsistency. The CJEU has adopted broad 
readings of the very standing provision it now steadfastly refuses to expand. 
 
In Les Verts, the French Green party sought to challenge a Parliament 
measure that governed claiming back funds expended on political 
campaigning. Art 173(1) CEE at the time provided for challenges to measures 
adopted by the Council and Commission, but not those of the Parliament, on 
a similar basis to Art 230(4) EC. Based on the text, therefore, the Greens did 
not have standing as the contested measure was adopted by Parliament, and 
not the Commission or the Council. However, the CJEU held the action 
                                                 
199 See, for example, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores, fn 70. 
200 See, amongst many sources, Peter Lindseth, 'Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European 
Community' (1999) Columbia Law Review 628, 664 who refers to this approach as a 
'maximalist interpretation' of the CJEU's powers.  
201 Case C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Costa v ENEL. 
202 Case C-479/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:372, Francovich v Italy. 
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admissible. The inability to challenge acts of Parliament was 'contrary both 
to the spirit of the Treaty (…) and to its system'. Consequently, the CJEU 
allowed the challenge to the measure adopted by the Parliament, in spite of 
the Treaty text. The Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, who reached the 
same conclusion as the CJEU, sheds light on this conclusion.203 He noted 
that, interpreted literally, Article 173 would render the action inadmissible, 
but nonetheless started from the position that interpretation granting the 
greatest measure of protection should be preferred. 
 
Thus, the court was not constrained by the literal meaning of the text, but 
endorsed a far-reaching interpretation that assured the concept of legality in 
the Community system. The objections to admissibility melted away, despite 
the clear text of the article, in the furnace of teleological interpretation. 
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to have sympathy for the courts' pleas 
that they are powerless to expand the admissibility criteria in Art 263(4) – the 
teleological approach in Les Verts could easily allow for expansion of the 
present approach. 
 
In any case it should be borne in mind that the result in Les Verts was even 
more drastic than what would be required to relax the rigour of the standing 
rules. In that case, the CJEU read in 'Parliament' into Art 173 EEC. In so 
doing, it deviated from the Treaty text itself. In the present context, all that is 
required is to adopt a more lenient interpretation of the Treaty text. The 
interpretation of the requirements in Art 263(4) is the product of case-law. It 
is not ineluctably ordained by the Treaties.204 It would be entirely possible 
for the CJEU to re-interpret those provisions in a more lax fashion without 
straying beyond the confines of the Lisbon Treaty.205 A lack of jurisdiction 
does not seem to be the issue – it seems to be rather a lack of will. 
                                                 
203 Case 294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:483, Les Verts v Parliament, Opinion of Advocate 
General Mancini. 
204 Craig, fn 15, 505; Biernat, fn 14, p. 41; Kornezov, 120. Note that Advocate General 
Jacobs in his Opinion for the Unión de Pequeños Agricultores case, fn 70, did not 
jettison the text of Art 263(4), he considered that his expansive interpretation of 
direct and individual concern could be accommodated within its wording.  
205 Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:905, Criminal proceedings 
against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, [16]. 
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D. Deflecting Responsibility for Solving the Dilemma  
The courts deflect responsibility for the dilemma by pointing to Art 19(1) 
TEU. The argument is perplexing in that it proves too much and too little. 
 
The argument proves too little in that it not clear how the humble sentence 
added to Art 19(1) requires the Member States to shoulder the responsibility 
to solve the dilemma. First, that provision simply imposes a general 
obligation on Member States to 'provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law'. It is not clear 
how this general obligation on Member States designates them as the primary 
sources of the solution to the dilemma. Second, it is not clear how Art 19(1) 
assists national jurisdictions to solve the dilemma. If there are no national 
procedural rules that can be relied on to bring one's challenge to the national 
courts, it is unlikely that they could simply conjure up access to the courts on 
the basis of Art 19(1) alone. As was explained in Inuit, that article does not 
create any new remedies at the national level to ensure the observance of EU 
law.206 It could not be used to found a freestanding right of access to the 
courts. If there are indeed national procedural rules, but they explicitly 
preclude access to the courts on the facts of a given case, it is also 
questionable to what extent co-operative obligations in Art 19(1) could 
require domestic courts to disregard them.207 This would be supported by the 
court's approach to the principle of harmonious interpretation descried from 
Art 4(3) TEU208, in which national judicatures are required to interpret 
domestic law in accordance with EU law, but not to the extent of foisting a 
                                                 
206 See, Inuit, fn 12, [103] 'neither the FEU Treaty nor Article 19 TEU intended to create 
new remedies before the national courts to ensure the observance of European 
Union law other than those already laid down by national law'; 
207 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-132/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:335, 
Stichting Woonpunt and others v Commission 'the duty of genuine cooperation cannot 
extend so far as to require the Member States to create access to national courts 
where no State measure is at issue'. 
208 Indeed, as can be seen in Jégo Quéré, this deflection argument was initially founded 
on Art 10 EC, the predecessor to Art 4(3) TEU. See Jégo Quéré, fn 146, [32]. 
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contra legem interpretation on it.209 Overall, it is surely a tall order to locate a 
universal solution, despite the idiosyncrasies of 28 domestic legal systems and 
the factual permutations of an individual case, in a single line of Art 19(1). 
 
It also proves too much. If the solution to the standing conundrum can be 
found by pointing to access to national courts, there would not have been any 
need to amend Art 263(4) in the first place. The obligation to provide 
effective remedies for EU law, now enshrined in Art 19(1) TEU, clearly 
existed prior to the Lisbon Treaty.210 Its insertion into the Lisbon Treaty was 
understood as being a codification of existing case law.211 If we are to take the 
courts' reliance on Art 19(1) at face value, we must also accept that there was 
no problem with the pre-Lisbon position – in blatant contrast to the impetus 
leading to the Lisbon reforms. 
 
3. The Desirability of Broader Admissibility Criteria 
Many arguments can be found in favour of broadening the EU standing rules. 
Three may be touched on here.  
 
From the perspective of legal certainty, the narrowness of the third head 
means that many claimants must navigate the unpredictable waters of the 
second head. 212 To wit, the claimants in the Woonpunt case failed in the 
                                                 
209 Case C-106/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:395, Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion; Case C-282/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, Dominguez v Centre 
informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Others. 
210 See, for example, Case C-222/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, Johnson v Chief Constable 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
211 René Barents, 'The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2010) CMLR 709, 
725. 
212 On direct concern, see Case 11/82, ECLI:EU:C:1985:18, Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v 
Commission and Case C-386/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:1998:193, Dreyfus v Commission which 
were distinguished on their facts by the General Court in Case T-453/10, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:106, Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development v European Commission, [60] to [65], and labelled 'exceptional' on appeal 
by the CJEU on appeal in Case C-248/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:137, at [26]; compare, 
also, Piraiki-Patraiki (above) with Case C-222/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:266, Municipality 
of Differdange v Commission; See also Albertina Albors-Lorens, 'Sealing the fate of 
private parties in annulment proceedings? The General Court and the New Standing 
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General Court yet succeeded on appeal because of the difference of views 
between the two courts on whether they fell within a 'closed group' of 
operators.213 The claim BP Products was admissible because their data was 
used in the imposition of anti-dumping duties214; the challenge in Bricmate 
failed because this was not the case.215 As evidenced by Beul and ABZ, 
standing may still turn on whether one can claim one's position is sufficiently 
proximate to the lucky claimants in Codorníu.216 
 
This murky jurisprudence could easily be avoided if the courts were to allow 
for more liberal standing rules and dispose of cases on their merits. It could 
offer considerably more certainty than present position, avoid the need for 
recourse to ad hoc sleights-of-hand, and lead to a more coherent standing 
scheme in EU law. 
 
Institutionally, there are concerns with the approach endorsed by the courts. 
Direct challenges are heard, first, before the General Court, with the 
possibility of appeal to the CJEU on a point of law only.217 Preliminary 
references, however, are referred directly to the CJEU. Given that the CJEU 
claims it faces an unmanageable increase in caseload and that the General 
Court has recently been doubled in size, it makes sense for the standing rules 
to be liberalised.218 More preliminarily references which would otherwise 
                                                 
test in Article 263(4)' (2012) CLJ 52, 53 'the closed category test was not consistently 
applied… a cluster of satellite interpretations [of individual concern] soon appeared'. 
On individual concern, compare Codorníu, fn 14 and the courts' attempts to 
distinguish it in subsequent cases e.g. Case T-640/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:907, Carsten 
Beul v Parliament and Council; Case T-560/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:314, ABZ Aardbeien 
Uit Zaad v Parliament and Council. Note that Case T-559/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:315 
Ackermann Saatzucht GmbH & Co. KG, see fn 142-143. 
213 Woonpunt fn 32, [62]; T-203/10, ECLI:EU:T:2011:766, Woonpunt and Others v 
Commission, [38]. 
214 BP Products, fn 59. 
215 Bricmate, fn 48. 
216 See fn 144. 
217 Art 256 TFEU; Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of The 
European Union, OJ C 83/210, Art 56. 
218 See, for context, and also criticism, Franklin Dehousse and Benedetta Marsicola, 
'The Reform of the EU Courts: Abandoning the Management Approach by 
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have to be ruled on by the CJEU's consideration will be dealt with as direct 
challenges in front of the General Court. This avoids the situation where the 
CJEU is beleaguered by preliminary references, some of which may well be 
individualised disputes disguised as point of general importance of EU law219, 
which would otherwise have been heard as direct challenges in front of the 
General Court. It would be far preferable for these to be challenged before 
the General Court, and then, if necessary, make their way to the CJEU for 
determination on a point of law. This could avoid the bottlenecking of 
disputes in the CJEU, and ensure that cases are dealt with by the court most 
appropriate to their importance. 
 
Politically, the present position is unsatisfactory in that it undermines the 
democratic credentials of the Union.220 The ability of parties to subject 
norms to scrutiny by challenging them in the courts is an integral element of 
any democratic system.221 The argument has been often traversed in the 
literature and will not be rehearsed here, but it is clear that these challenges 
are key to, amongst other values, accountability, by keeping those who 
promulgate the norms in check, legitimacy, by ensuring the proper 
application of EU law, and participation, by permitting the citizenry to 
                                                 
Doubling the General Court,' Egmont Paper 83, March 2016 retrieved here 
http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ep83.pdf.pdf, 28th June 2016. 
219 Craig, fn 15, 503-4; see, for an example of such a trivial case, C-338/95, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:552, Wiener on whether a given garment intended for use at night, 
but with a cut such as to allow it to also be used for leisure wear, was a nightdress or 
a dress of synthetic textile fibres.  
220 See Case T-541/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, ADEDY, on challenges to certain aspects 
of the EU response to the Greek debt crisis where, at [96], the General Court states 
'the applicants' allegation that the substance of the action must be examined, since 
the defects in the contested acts are so serious that they undermine public trust in 
European Union bodies must be rejected. The European Union courts cannot ignore 
the rules laid down in Article 263 TFEU for admissibility of actions for annulment.'. 
221 Paul Craig, 'Accountability and Judicial Review in the UK and the EU: Central 
Precepts' in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Accountability in the 
Contemporary Constitution (OUP, 2013); See also Harry Woolf and Others, De Smith's 
Judicial Review, 7th Ed (2015, Sweet and Maxwell) at 2-005; Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott, in Inuit, fn 69, [21]. 
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engage with the norms that bind them.222 Liberalising standing could have 
positive consequences given the concerns of 'democratic deficit' in the 
Union.223 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
So why is standing still so difficult to satisfy? On a purely textual level, the 
answer is that the courts have interpreted the admissibility criteria in the 
third head very restrictively. The notion of implementing measures is 
incredibly broad, and it is kept rigidly separate from the criterion of direct 
concern. This prevents a more substantive interpretation of implementing 
measures. As a result, it is often more difficult to satisfy this criterion than 
the notoriously high standard of 'individual concern'. It also limits the kinds 
of acts that can be challenged, and excludes entire areas from the potentially 
liberalising effects of the third head. Likewise, the criterion of 'regulatory 
measures' is given a narrow meaning. This adds yet another element of 
casuistry to the EU standing rules, and makes legislative acts just as difficult 
to challenge as they were prior to the Lisbon reforms – if not practically 
impossible. 
 
On a doctrinal level, the courts assume that indirect challenges provide 
effective judicial protection such that it is not necessary to expand the 
standing rules in Art 263(4). When confronted with the plight of litigants who 
would have to break the law in order to challenge it, the courts deny the scope 
of this dilemma, disclaim they have the power to solve it, and deflect 
responsibility for its solution. 
                                                 
222 Indeed, the importance of judicial review is recognised within the EU system itself. 
See, for example, Les Verts, fn 90, [25] on the role of standing in ensuring bodies 
remain within the confines of their powers.  
223 Biernat, fn 14, 16, see also Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 
(OUP, 1999), p. 47; Carol Harlow, 'Toward a Theory of Access for the European 
Court of Justice' (1992) Yearbook of European Law 213, 248; Mariolina Eliantonio 
and Nelly Stratieva 'From Plaumann, through UPA and Jégo-Quéré, to the Lisbon 
Treaty: The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Art 263(4) EC Through a 
Political Lens' Maastricht Faculty of Law Paper 2009/13; Albertina Albors-Lorens, 
'Remedies against the EU institutions after Lisbon: an era of opportunity?' (2012) 
CLJ 507, 508. 
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This goes a long way in explaining why, when faced with the possibility of 
relaxing standing rules, the courts continue to tow a restrictive line. As far 
they are concerned, the Treaties offer a complete system of legal remedies, 
any issues with this system are to be directed to the Member State level. It is 
up to national bodies to provide access to domestic courts to challenge EU 
norms. If they do so, the dilemma is to their mind solved and claimants would 
enjoy full vindication of their right to effective judicial protection. 
 
Ultimately, however, the courts' fundamental assumption is flawed and its 
three supporting arguments are meagre. Indirect challenges are manifestly 
inadequate substitutes for direct challenges. There is no point denying the 
dilemma. It has not been plugged by the courts' interpretation of the third 
head. It continues to rear its ugly head in cases like T and L. It is a beast that 
still plagues this area, and one to which effective judicial protection continues 
to fall prey. It is disingenuous to disclaim responsibility for the dilemma. The 
courts' institutional arguments show an intransigent refusal to consider the 
ways in which they could permissibly relax the standing rules, and the 
jurisdictional arguments are smokescreens for lack of will to do so. It is 
inappropriate to deflect responsibility. It assumes, contrary to common sense 
and principle, that the solution to the deficiencies in this area lies at the 
national level. The courts simply pass the buck to Member States, and, in so 
doing, show contumelious disregard of the exclusive role they play in the 
interpretation of admissibility criteria in Art 263(4). This judicial abdication 
continues to deny individuals their right to effective judicial protection, and, 
in turn, seriously undermines the legitimacy of the Union system of judicial 
review. 
 
Consistency is evidently not a value to be deprecated, least of all in law. But 
in the context of standing which is not only recognised as incoherent from 
within the EU judicature, but which has also been the subject of Treaty 
amendment, it is clearly problematic. The addition of the third head, beyond 
the lucky plight of the four cases examined above, has not taken us 
considerably further from when Plaumann imported its clementines in the 
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early 1960s.224 It is not only the admissibility criteria for direct actions that 
remain difficult to satisfy; the courts have refused to shift, in any significant 
manner, their approach to standing. Despite the dissenting threnodies from 
Advocates General, the Court of First Instance and academic literature, the 
courts sadly peddle the same arguments advanced prior to the Lisbon reform. 
This continues to restrict the possibility of direct challenge before the EU 
judicature as narrowly as possible. 
 
The courts have not budged. They have dug their heels in and stood their 
ground. Shakespeare's porter might rejoice, but those who expect the courts 
to make good on their promises of effective judicial protection; those who 
believe the rule of law must actually be applied and not just referenced in 
passing; and those who seek from the Treaties a truly complete system of legal 
remedies are left thoroughly disappointed. 
 
 
                                                 
224 Note that the argument was already being made before Lisbon reforms, see Anthony 
Arnull, The Action for Annulment: A Case of Double Standards?, in David O'Keefe 
(ed) Judicial Review in European Union Law (Wolters Kluwer, 2001), 189 'What may 
have been appropriate in the 1960s and 1970s is no longer so at the beginning of the 
new millennium', quoted Xavier Lewis 'Standing of Private Plaintiffs to Annul 
Generally Applicable European Community Measures: If the System is Broken, 
Where Should it be Fixed?' (2006) Fordham International Law Journal 1496, 1498. 
